#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/un.h>
#include <net/af_unix.h>
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
+ struct avc_operation_node *ops_node;
};
struct avc_node {
u32 latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */
};
+struct avc_operation_decision_node {
+ struct operation_decision od;
+ struct list_head od_list;
+};
+
+struct avc_operation_node {
+ struct operation ops;
+ struct list_head od_head; /* list of operation_decision_node */
+};
+
struct avc_callback_node {
int (*callback) (u32 event);
u32 events;
static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_operation_decision_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_operation_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avc_operation_perm_cachep;
static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_operation_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_operation_node",
+ sizeof(struct avc_operation_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_operation_decision_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create(
+ "avc_operation_decision_node",
+ sizeof(struct avc_operation_decision_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avc_operation_perm_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_operation_perm",
+ sizeof(struct operation_perm),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC INITIALIZED\n");
}
slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
}
+/*
+ * using a linked list for operation_decision lookup because the list is
+ * always small. i.e. less than 5, typically 1
+ */
+static struct operation_decision *avc_operation_lookup(u8 type,
+ struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
+{
+ struct avc_operation_decision_node *od_node;
+ struct operation_decision *od = NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(od_node, &ops_node->od_head, od_list) {
+ if (od_node->od.type != type)
+ continue;
+ od = &od_node->od;
+ break;
+ }
+ return od;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int avc_operation_has_perm(struct operation_decision *od,
+ u16 cmd, u8 specified)
+{
+ unsigned int rc = 0;
+ u8 num = cmd & 0xff;
+
+ if ((specified == OPERATION_ALLOWED) &&
+ (od->specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED))
+ rc = security_operation_test(od->allowed->perms, num);
+ else if ((specified == OPERATION_AUDITALLOW) &&
+ (od->specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW))
+ rc = security_operation_test(od->auditallow->perms, num);
+ else if ((specified == OPERATION_DONTAUDIT) &&
+ (od->specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT))
+ rc = security_operation_test(od->dontaudit->perms, num);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void avc_operation_allow_perm(struct avc_operation_node *node, u16 cmd)
+{
+ struct operation_decision *od;
+ u8 type;
+ u8 num;
+
+ type = cmd >> 8;
+ num = cmd & 0xff;
+ security_operation_set(node->ops.type, type);
+ od = avc_operation_lookup(type, node);
+ if (od && od->allowed)
+ security_operation_set(od->allowed->perms, num);
+}
+
+static void avc_operation_decision_free(
+ struct avc_operation_decision_node *od_node)
+{
+ struct operation_decision *od;
+
+ od = &od_node->od;
+ if (od->allowed)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_perm_cachep, od->allowed);
+ if (od->auditallow)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_perm_cachep, od->auditallow);
+ if (od->dontaudit)
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_perm_cachep, od->dontaudit);
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_decision_node_cachep, od_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_operation_free(struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
+{
+ struct avc_operation_decision_node *od_node;
+
+ if (!ops_node)
+ return;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(od_node, &ops_node->od_head, od_list)
+ avc_operation_decision_free(od_node);
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_operation_node_cachep, ops_node);
+}
+
+static void avc_copy_operation_decision(struct operation_decision *dest,
+ struct operation_decision *src)
+{
+ dest->type = src->type;
+ dest->specified = src->specified;
+ if (dest->specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED)
+ memcpy(dest->allowed->perms, src->allowed->perms,
+ sizeof(src->allowed->perms));
+ if (dest->specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW)
+ memcpy(dest->auditallow->perms, src->auditallow->perms,
+ sizeof(src->auditallow->perms));
+ if (dest->specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT)
+ memcpy(dest->dontaudit->perms, src->dontaudit->perms,
+ sizeof(src->dontaudit->perms));
+}
+
+/*
+ * similar to avc_copy_operation_decision, but only copy decision
+ * information relevant to this command
+ */
+static inline void avc_quick_copy_operation_decision(u16 cmd,
+ struct operation_decision *dest,
+ struct operation_decision *src)
+{
+ /*
+ * compute index of the u32 of the 256 bits (8 u32s) that contain this
+ * command permission
+ */
+ u8 i = (0xff & cmd) >> 5;
+
+ dest->specified = src->specified;
+ if (dest->specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED)
+ dest->allowed->perms[i] = src->allowed->perms[i];
+ if (dest->specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW)
+ dest->auditallow->perms[i] = src->auditallow->perms[i];
+ if (dest->specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT)
+ dest->dontaudit->perms[i] = src->dontaudit->perms[i];
+}
+
+static struct avc_operation_decision_node
+ *avc_operation_decision_alloc(u8 specified)
+{
+ struct avc_operation_decision_node *node;
+ struct operation_decision *od;
+
+ node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_decision_node_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!node)
+ return NULL;
+
+ od = &node->od;
+ if (specified & OPERATION_ALLOWED) {
+ od->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_perm_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!od->allowed)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (specified & OPERATION_AUDITALLOW) {
+ od->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_perm_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!od->auditallow)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (specified & OPERATION_DONTAUDIT) {
+ od->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_perm_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!od->dontaudit)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ return node;
+error:
+ avc_operation_decision_free(node);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int avc_add_operation(struct avc_node *node,
+ struct operation_decision *od)
+{
+ struct avc_operation_decision_node *dest_od;
+
+ node->ae.ops_node->ops.len++;
+ dest_od = avc_operation_decision_alloc(od->specified);
+ if (!dest_od)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ avc_copy_operation_decision(&dest_od->od, od);
+ list_add(&dest_od->od_list, &node->ae.ops_node->od_head);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct avc_operation_node *avc_operation_alloc(void)
+{
+ struct avc_operation_node *ops;
+
+ ops = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_operation_node_cachep,
+ GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
+ if (!ops)
+ return ops;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ops->od_head);
+ return ops;
+}
+
+static int avc_operation_populate(struct avc_node *node,
+ struct avc_operation_node *src)
+{
+ struct avc_operation_node *dest;
+ struct avc_operation_decision_node *dest_od;
+ struct avc_operation_decision_node *src_od;
+
+ if (src->ops.len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ dest = avc_operation_alloc();
+ if (!dest)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(dest->ops.type, &src->ops.type, sizeof(dest->ops.type));
+ dest->ops.len = src->ops.len;
+
+ /* for each source od allocate a destination od and copy */
+ list_for_each_entry(src_od, &src->od_head, od_list) {
+ dest_od = avc_operation_decision_alloc(src_od->od.specified);
+ if (!dest_od)
+ goto error;
+ avc_copy_operation_decision(&dest_od->od, &src_od->od);
+ list_add(&dest_od->od_list, &dest->od_head);
+ }
+ node->ae.ops_node = dest;
+ return 0;
+error:
+ avc_operation_free(dest);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+}
+
+static inline u32 avc_operation_audit_required(u32 requested,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct operation_decision *od,
+ u16 cmd,
+ int result,
+ u32 *deniedp)
+{
+ u32 denied, audited;
+
+ denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
+ if (unlikely(denied)) {
+ audited = denied & avd->auditdeny;
+ if (audited && od) {
+ if (avc_operation_has_perm(od, cmd,
+ OPERATION_DONTAUDIT))
+ audited &= ~requested;
+ }
+ } else if (result) {
+ audited = denied = requested;
+ } else {
+ audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
+ if (audited && od) {
+ if (!avc_operation_has_perm(od, cmd,
+ OPERATION_AUDITALLOW))
+ audited &= ~requested;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *deniedp = denied;
+ return audited;
+}
+
+static inline int avc_operation_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct operation_decision *od,
+ u16 cmd, int result,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ u32 audited, denied;
+
+ audited = avc_operation_audit_required(
+ requested, avd, od, cmd, result, &denied);
+ if (likely(!audited))
+ return 0;
+ return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
+}
+
static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
{
struct avc_node *node = container_of(rhead, struct avc_node, rhead);
+ avc_operation_free(node->ae.ops_node);
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
}
static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
{
+ avc_operation_free(node->ae.ops_node);
kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @avd: resulting av decision
+ * @ops: resulting operation decisions
*
* Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
* (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
* the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
* avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
{
struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
int hvalue;
if (node) {
struct hlist_head *head;
spinlock_t *lock;
+ int rc = 0;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-
+ rc = avc_operation_populate(node, ops_node);
+ if (rc) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+ return NULL;
+ }
head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
* @perms : Permission mask bits
* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
+ * @od: operation_decision to be added to the node
*
* if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
* if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
* otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
* will release later by RCU.
*/
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
- u32 seqno)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u16 cmd, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+ struct operation_decision *od,
+ u32 flags)
{
int hvalue, rc = 0;
unsigned long flag;
avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
+ if (orig->ae.ops_node) {
+ rc = avc_operation_populate(node, orig->ae.ops_node);
+ if (rc) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ }
+
switch (event) {
case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
node->ae.avd.allowed |= perms;
+ if (node->ae.ops_node && (flags & AVC_OPERATION_CMD))
+ avc_operation_allow_perm(node->ae.ops_node, cmd);
break;
case AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE:
case AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE:
case AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE:
node->ae.avd.auditdeny &= ~perms;
break;
+ case AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_OPERATION:
+ avc_add_operation(node, od);
+ break;
}
avc_node_replace(node, orig);
out_unlock:
* results in a bigger stack frame.
*/
static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct avc_operation_node *ops_node)
{
rcu_read_unlock();
- security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ops_node->od_head);
+ security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &ops_node->ops);
rcu_read_lock();
- return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+ return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, ops_node);
}
static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, u32 requested,
- unsigned flags,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u16 cmd, unsigned flags,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
{
if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
return -EACCES;
if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
return -EACCES;
- avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
- tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
+ avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, cmd, ssid,
+ tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * ioctl commands are comprised of four fields, direction, size, type, and
+ * number. The avc operation logic filters based on two of them:
+ *
+ * type: or code, typically unique to each driver
+ * number: or function
+ *
+ * For example, 0x89 is a socket type, and number 0x27 is the get hardware
+ * address function.
+ */
+int avc_has_operation(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u16 cmd, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ struct avc_node *node;
+ struct av_decision avd;
+ u32 denied;
+ struct operation_decision *od = NULL;
+ struct operation_decision od_local;
+ struct operation_perm allowed;
+ struct operation_perm auditallow;
+ struct operation_perm dontaudit;
+ struct avc_operation_node local_ops_node;
+ struct avc_operation_node *ops_node;
+ u8 type = cmd >> 8;
+ int rc = 0, rc2;
+
+ ops_node = &local_ops_node;
+ BUG_ON(!requested);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+ if (unlikely(!node)) {
+ node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, ops_node);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
+ ops_node = node->ae.ops_node;
+ }
+ /* if operations are not defined, only consider av_decision */
+ if (!ops_node || !ops_node->ops.len)
+ goto decision;
+
+ od_local.allowed = &allowed;
+ od_local.auditallow = &auditallow;
+ od_local.dontaudit = &dontaudit;
+
+ /* lookup operation decision */
+ od = avc_operation_lookup(type, ops_node);
+ if (unlikely(!od)) {
+ /* Compute operation decision if type is flagged */
+ if (!security_operation_test(ops_node->ops.type, type)) {
+ avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+ goto decision;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ security_compute_operation(ssid, tsid, tclass, type, &od_local);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_OPERATION, requested, cmd,
+ ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &od_local, 0);
+ } else {
+ avc_quick_copy_operation_decision(cmd, &od_local, od);
+ }
+ od = &od_local;
+
+ if (!avc_operation_has_perm(od, cmd, OPERATION_ALLOWED))
+ avd.allowed &= ~requested;
+
+decision:
+ denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
+ if (unlikely(denied))
+ rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, cmd,
+ AVC_OPERATION_CMD, &avd);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ rc2 = avc_operation_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+ &avd, od, cmd, rc, ad);
+ if (rc2)
+ return rc2;
+ return rc;
+}
/**
* avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
+ struct avc_operation_node ops_node;
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
rcu_read_lock();
node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- if (unlikely(!node)) {
- node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
- } else {
+ if (unlikely(!node))
+ node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &ops_node);
+ else
memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
- avd = &node->ae.avd;
- }
denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
if (unlikely(denied))
- rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, flags, avd);
+ rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, flags, avd);
rcu_read_unlock();
return rc;
file_free_security(file);
}
+/*
+ * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
+ * operation to an inode.
+ */
+int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+ u32 requested, u16 cmd)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
+ u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
+ int rc;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
+ ad.u.op = &ioctl;
+ ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
+ ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
+
+ if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+ SECCLASS_FD,
+ FD__USE,
+ &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = avc_has_operation(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+ requested, cmd, &ad);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
* to the file's ioctl() function.
*/
default:
- error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
+ error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
}
return error;
}
}
#define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
+#define AVC_OPERATION_CMD 2 /* ignore command when updating operations */
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
struct av_decision *avd);
+int avc_has_operation(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ u16 cmd, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITALLOW_DISABLE 32
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_ENABLE 64
#define AVC_CALLBACK_AUDITDENY_DISABLE 128
+#define AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_OPERATION 256
int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS 27
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS 30
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
#else
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS
#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
u32 flags;
};
+#define security_operation_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f))
+#define security_operation_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f)))
+
+struct operation_perm {
+ u32 perms[8];
+};
+
+struct operation_decision {
+ u8 type;
+ u8 specified;
+ struct operation_perm *allowed;
+ struct operation_perm *auditallow;
+ struct operation_perm *dontaudit;
+};
+
+#define OPERATION_ALLOWED 1
+#define OPERATION_AUDITALLOW 2
+#define OPERATION_DONTAUDIT 4
+#define OPERATION_ALL (OPERATION_ALLOWED | OPERATION_AUDITALLOW |\
+ OPERATION_DONTAUDIT)
+struct operation {
+ u16 len; /* length of operation decision chain */
+ u32 type[8]; /* 256 types */
+};
+
/* definitions of av_decision.flags */
#define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001
void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
- u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct operation *ops);
+
+void security_compute_operation(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u8 type, struct operation_decision *od);
void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
#include "policydb.h"
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_operation_cachep;
static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u16 mask)
{
struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
struct avtab_node *newnode;
+ struct avtab_operation *ops;
newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (newnode == NULL)
return NULL;
newnode->key = *key;
- newnode->datum = *datum;
+
+ if (key->specified & AVTAB_OP) {
+ ops = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_operation_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (ops == NULL) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *ops = *(datum->u.ops);
+ newnode->datum.u.ops = ops;
+ } else {
+ newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+ }
+
if (prev) {
newnode->next = prev->next;
prev->next = newnode;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
- (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
+ if (specified & AVTAB_OPNUM)
+ break;
return -EEXIST;
+ }
if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
while (cur) {
temp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
+ if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_OP)
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_operation_cachep,
+ temp->datum.u.ops);
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
}
h->htable[i] = NULL;
AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
AVTAB_TRANSITION,
AVTAB_CHANGE,
- AVTAB_MEMBER
+ AVTAB_MEMBER,
+ AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED,
+ AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW,
+ AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT,
+ AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED,
+ AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW,
+ AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT
};
int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
{
__le16 buf16[4];
u16 enabled;
- __le32 buf32[7];
u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
struct avtab_key key;
struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_operation ops;
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(ops.op.perms)];
int i, rc;
unsigned set;
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (val & AVTAB_OP) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has operations\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (val & spec_order[i]) {
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
- datum.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
if (rc)
return rc;
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
-
items = 0;
key.source_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
key.target_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
return -EINVAL;
}
- rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
- return rc;
+ if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS)
+ || !(key.specified & AVTAB_OP)) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
+ } else {
+ memset(&ops, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_operation));
+ rc = next_entry(&ops.type, fp, sizeof(u8));
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(ops.op.perms));
+ if (rc) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ops.op.perms); i++)
+ ops.op.perms[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ datum.u.ops = &ops;
}
- datum.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
- !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.data)) {
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
{
__le16 buf16[4];
- __le32 buf32[1];
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms)];
int rc;
+ unsigned int i;
buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
- buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.data);
- rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+
+ if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_OP) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms); i++)
+ buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i]);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.ops->op.perms), fp);
+ } else {
+ buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ }
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
sizeof(struct avtab_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avtab_operation_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_operation",
+ sizeof(struct avtab_operation),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
+ kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_operation_cachep);
}
#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#include "security.h"
+
struct avtab_key {
u16 source_type; /* source type */
u16 target_type; /* target type */
#define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
#define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+#define AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED 0x0100
+#define AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
+#define AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT 0x0400
+#define AVTAB_OPNUM (AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED | \
+ AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW | \
+ AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT)
+#define AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED 0x1000
+#define AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW 0x2000
+#define AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT 0x4000
+#define AVTAB_OPTYPE (AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED | \
+ AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW | \
+ AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT)
+#define AVTAB_OP (AVTAB_OPNUM | AVTAB_OPTYPE)
#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
};
+struct avtab_operation {
+ u8 type;
+ struct operation_perm op;
+};
+
struct avtab_datum {
- u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+ union {
+ u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+ struct avtab_operation *ops; /* ioctl operations */
+ } u;
};
struct avtab_node {
#include "security.h"
#include "conditional.h"
+#include "services.h"
/*
* cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
return 0;
}
+
+void cond_compute_operation(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct operation_decision *od)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+
+ if (!ctab || !key || !od)
+ return;
+
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+ services_compute_operation_num(od, node);
+ }
+ return;
+
+}
/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
* av table, and if so, add them to the result
*/
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd)
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct operation *ops)
{
struct avtab_node *node;
- if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+ if (!ctab || !key || !avd || !ops)
return;
for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
- avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
/* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
* the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
* are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
*/
- avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
(node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
- avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+ if ((node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+ (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OP))
+ services_compute_operation_type(ops, node);
}
return;
}
int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
-void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, struct av_decision *avd);
-
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct operation *ops);
+void cond_compute_operation(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct operation_decision *od);
int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IOCTL_OPERATIONS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
};
static struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
u32 *scontext_len);
static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
- struct context *tcontext,
- u16 tclass,
- struct av_decision *avd);
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct operation *ops);
struct selinux_mapping {
u16 value; /* policy value */
context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
tcontext,
tclass,
- &lo_avd);
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
&lo_tcontext,
tclass,
- &lo_avd);
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
&lo_tcontext,
tclass,
- &lo_avd);
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
return; /* no masked permission */
masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
}
}
+/* flag ioctl types that have operation permissions */
+void services_compute_operation_type(
+ struct operation *ops,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ u8 type;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPTYPE) {
+ /* if allowing one or more complete types */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ops->type); i++)
+ ops->type[i] |= node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
+ } else {
+ /* if allowing operations within a type */
+ type = node->datum.u.ops->type;
+ security_operation_set(ops->type, type);
+ }
+
+ /* If no ioctl commands are allowed, ignore auditallow and auditdeny */
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED ||
+ node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED)
+ ops->len = 1;
+}
+
/*
- * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
- * the permissions in a particular class.
+ * Compute access vectors and operations ranges based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
*/
static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
- struct context *tcontext,
- u16 tclass,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct operation *ops)
{
struct constraint_node *constraint;
struct role_allow *ra;
avd->allowed = 0;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (ops) {
+ memset(&ops->type, 0, sizeof(ops->type));
+ ops->len = 0;
+ }
if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
if (printk_ratelimit())
* this permission check, then use it.
*/
avkey.target_class = tclass;
- avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_OP;
sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!sattr);
tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
node;
node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
- avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
- avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
- avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (ops && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OP))
+ services_compute_operation_type(ops, node);
}
/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
- cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd, ops);
}
}
avd->flags = 0;
}
+void services_compute_operation_num(struct operation_decision *od,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_OPNUM) {
+ if (od->type != node->datum.u.ops->type)
+ return;
+ } else {
+ if (!security_operation_test(node->datum.u.ops->op.perms,
+ od->type))
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPTYPE_ALLOWED) {
+ od->specified |= OPERATION_ALLOWED;
+ memset(od->allowed->perms, 0xff,
+ sizeof(od->allowed->perms));
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPTYPE_AUDITALLOW) {
+ od->specified |= OPERATION_AUDITALLOW;
+ memset(od->auditallow->perms, 0xff,
+ sizeof(od->auditallow->perms));
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPTYPE_DONTAUDIT) {
+ od->specified |= OPERATION_DONTAUDIT;
+ memset(od->dontaudit->perms, 0xff,
+ sizeof(od->dontaudit->perms));
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPNUM_ALLOWED) {
+ od->specified |= OPERATION_ALLOWED;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(od->allowed->perms); i++)
+ od->allowed->perms[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPNUM_AUDITALLOW) {
+ od->specified |= OPERATION_AUDITALLOW;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(od->auditallow->perms); i++)
+ od->auditallow->perms[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_OPNUM_DONTAUDIT) {
+ od->specified |= OPERATION_DONTAUDIT;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(od->dontaudit->perms); i++)
+ od->dontaudit->perms[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.ops->op.perms[i];
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+void security_compute_operation(u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u8 type,
+ struct operation_decision *od)
+{
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ od->type = type;
+ od->specified = 0;
+ memset(od->allowed->perms, 0, sizeof(od->allowed->perms));
+ memset(od->auditallow->perms, 0, sizeof(od->auditallow->perms));
+ memset(od->dontaudit->perms, 0, sizeof(od->dontaudit->perms));
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ goto allow;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_OP;
+ sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+ scontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!sattr);
+ tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+ tcontext->type - 1);
+ BUG_ON(!tattr);
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+ services_compute_operation_num(od, node);
+
+ cond_compute_operation(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
+ &avkey, od);
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return;
+allow:
+ memset(od->allowed->perms, 0xff, sizeof(od->allowed->perms));
+ goto out;
+}
/**
* security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
* @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @od: operation decisions
*
* Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
* SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
u32 tsid,
u16 orig_tclass,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct operation *ops)
{
u16 tclass;
struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
avd_init(avd);
+ ops->len = 0;
if (!ss_initialized)
goto allow;
goto allow;
goto out;
}
- context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+ context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, ops);
map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
goto out;
}
- context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
+ context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return;
if (avdatum) {
/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
- newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
+ newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
}
/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
extern struct policydb policydb;
+void services_compute_operation_type(struct operation *ops,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+
+void services_compute_operation_num(struct operation_decision *od,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+
#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
projects / firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git / commitdiff