drm/radeon: forbid mapping of userptr bo through radeon device file

commit b5dcec693f87cb8475f2291c0075b2422addd3d6 upstream.

Allowing userptr bo which are basicly a list of page from some vma
(so either anonymous page or file backed page) would lead to serious
corruption of kernel structures and counters (because we overwrite
the page->mapping field when mapping buffer).

This will already block if the buffer was populated before anyone does
try to mmap it because then TTM_PAGE_FLAG_SG would be set in in the
ttm_tt flags. But that flag is check before ttm_tt_populate in the ttm
vm fault handler.

So to be safe just add a check to verify_access() callback.

Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
index e06ac546a90ff185a31f64b4ce6e9fd76d071adc..f342aad79cc6d2debc95269ac2552750647d28d2 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ static int radeon_verify_access(struct ttm_buffer_object *bo, struct file *filp)
 {
        struct radeon_bo *rbo = container_of(bo, struct radeon_bo, tbo);
 
+       if (radeon_ttm_tt_has_userptr(bo->ttm))
+               return -EPERM;
        return drm_vma_node_verify_access(&rbo->gem_base.vma_node, filp);
 }