arm64: dts: rk3399-sapphire: add iomux for hdmiin

[firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git] / security / Kconfig

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index e45237897b435f8fbf64950f580b9730f79eb1f4..d9c9b1f76059af4863c2edfc5672c4fdbe2edc84 100644 (file)
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
 
          If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
+       bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
+       depends on PERF_EVENTS
+       help
+         If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
+         will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
+         perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
+         changed.
+
 config SECURITY
        bool "Enable different security models"
        depends on SYSFS
@@ -118,12 +127,54 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
          this low address space will need the permission specific to the
          systems running LSM.
 
+config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+       bool
+       help
+         The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
+         validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
+         support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+       bool
+       help
+         The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by
+         calling check_object_size() just before performing the
+         userspace copies in the low level implementation of
+         copy_to_user() and copy_from_user().
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+       bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
+       depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY
+       depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+       select BUG
+       help
+         This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+         copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+         copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
+         are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
+         separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
+         or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
+         of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
+       bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
+       depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
+       depends on !COMPILE_TEST
+       help
+         When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
+         hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
+         however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
+         been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
+         trying to find such users.
+
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
 source security/yama/Kconfig
 
+source security/optee_linuxdriver/Kconfig
+
 source security/integrity/Kconfig
 
 choice