pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
authorKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Mon, 9 Mar 2015 21:11:12 +0000 (23:11 +0200)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sun, 19 Apr 2015 08:10:51 +0000 (10:10 +0200)
commite11b708502b0e249772e485585bec44be5fe8c70
tree8b6ccdcb7009f6db5f0312bfe60ff3d21f440949
parent391f1c610abe2db94c3e5c7ae20528ebf9ed682f
pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace

commit ab676b7d6fbf4b294bf198fb27ade5b0e865c7ce upstream.

As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: mancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
fs/proc/task_mmu.c