From 4accc8c8e2dbb1f5ff3d8836244a9423bd5e11a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Eric W. Biederman" Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 17:19:27 -0600 Subject: [PATCH] groups: Consolidate the setgroups permission checks commit 7ff4d90b4c24a03666f296c3d4878cd39001e81e upstream. Today there are 3 instances of setgroups and due to an oversight their permission checking has diverged. Add a common function so that they may all share the same permission checking code. This corrects the current oversight in the current permission checks and adds a helper to avoid this in the future. A user namespace security fix will update this new helper, shortly. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c | 2 +- include/linux/cred.h | 1 + kernel/groups.c | 9 ++++++++- kernel/uid16.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c index 8b6e4f5288a2..a98afed9348b 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys32_setgroups16(int gidsetsize, u16 __user *grouplist) struct group_info *group_info; int retval; - if (!capable(CAP_SETGID)) + if (!may_setgroups()) return -EPERM; if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h index 04421e825365..6c58dd7cb9ac 100644 --- a/include/linux/cred.h +++ b/include/linux/cred.h @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ extern void groups_free(struct group_info *); extern int set_current_groups(struct group_info *); extern int set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *); extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t); +extern bool may_setgroups(void); /* access the groups "array" with this macro */ #define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \ diff --git a/kernel/groups.c b/kernel/groups.c index 6b2588dd04ff..984bb629c68c 100644 --- a/kernel/groups.c +++ b/kernel/groups.c @@ -223,6 +223,13 @@ out: return i; } +bool may_setgroups(void) +{ + struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns(); + + return ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID); +} + /* * SMP: Our groups are copy-on-write. We can set them safely * without another task interfering. @@ -233,7 +240,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsize, gid_t __user *, grouplist) struct group_info *group_info; int retval; - if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) + if (!may_setgroups()) return -EPERM; if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c index f6c83d7ef000..d58cc4d8f0d1 100644 --- a/kernel/uid16.c +++ b/kernel/uid16.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidsetsize, old_gid_t __user *, grouplist) struct group_info *group_info; int retval; - if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) + if (!may_setgroups()) return -EPERM; if ((unsigned)gidsetsize > NGROUPS_MAX) return -EINVAL; -- 2.34.1