sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS

commit 128394eff343fc6d2f32172f03e24829539c5835 upstream.

Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those.  Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/block/bsg.c b/block/bsg.c
index d214e929ce1855bb653808f03482580b45b5344e..b9a53615bdef4945748057e5efbfef56c5cb4847 100644 (file)
--- a/block/bsg.c
+++ b/block/bsg.c
@@ -655,6 +655,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
        dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
 
+       if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        bsg_set_block(bd, file);
 
        bytes_written = 0;

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sg.c b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
index ae7d9bdf409c816d014ac2d668a1e449fce0c8e9..a1c29b0afb22e10cb4ae741a2080ad8cbcae1cbd 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -592,6 +592,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
        sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
        unsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE];
 
+       if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
        if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
                return -ENXIO;
        SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,