userns: Don't allow unprivileged creation of gid mappings

commit be7c6dba2332cef0677fbabb606e279ae76652c3 upstream.

As any gid mapping will allow and must allow for backwards
compatibility dropping groups don't allow any gid mappings to be
established without CAP_SETGID in the parent user namespace.

For a small class of applications this change breaks userspace
and removes useful functionality.  This small class of applications
includes tools/testing/selftests/mount/unprivilged-remount-test.c

Most of the removed functionality will be added back with the addition
of a one way knob to disable setgroups.  Once setgroups is disabled
setting the gid_map becomes as safe as setting the uid_map.

For more common applications that set the uid_map and the gid_map
with privilege this change will have no affect.

This is part of a fix for CVE-2014-8989.

Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index b083fa233daa63f494e6d4d2f41e8fb8caad7829..075020fa22fd988f54a09239b16227486cf3818f 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -810,11 +810,6 @@ static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
                        if (uid_eq(uid, file->f_cred->fsuid))
                                return true;
                }
-               else if (cap_setid == CAP_SETGID) {
-                       kgid_t gid = make_kgid(ns->parent, id);
-                       if (gid_eq(gid, file->f_cred->fsgid))
-                               return true;
-               }
        }
 
        /* Allow anyone to set a mapping that doesn't require privilege */