* 'audit.b3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current: (22 commits)
[PATCH] fix audit_init failure path
[PATCH] EXPORT_SYMBOL patch for audit_log, audit_log_start, audit_log_end and audit_format
[PATCH] sem2mutex: audit_netlink_sem
[PATCH] simplify audit_free() locking
[PATCH] Fix audit operators
[PATCH] promiscuous mode
[PATCH] Add tty to syscall audit records
[PATCH] add/remove rule update
[PATCH] audit string fields interface + consumer
[PATCH] SE Linux audit events
[PATCH] Minor cosmetic cleanups to the code moved into auditfilter.c
[PATCH] Fix audit record filtering with !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
[PATCH] Fix IA64 success/failure indication in syscall auditing.
[PATCH] Miscellaneous bug and warning fixes
[PATCH] Capture selinux subject/object context information.
[PATCH] Exclude messages by message type
[PATCH] Collect more inode information during syscall processing.
[PATCH] Pass dentry, not just name, in fsnotify creation hooks.
[PATCH] Define new range of userspace messages.
[PATCH] Filter rule comparators
...
Fixed trivial conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c
*/
/*
* [Sep 2001 AV] Single-semaphore locking scheme (kudos to David Holland)
- * implemented. Let's see if raised priority of ->s_vfs_rename_sem gives
+ * implemented. Let's see if raised priority of ->s_vfs_rename_mutex gives
* any extra contention...
*/
return -ENOENT;
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
+ audit_inode_child(victim->d_name.name, victim->d_inode, dir->i_ino);
error = permission(dir,MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC, NULL);
if (error)
return NULL;
}
- down(&p1->d_inode->i_sb->s_vfs_rename_sem);
+ mutex_lock(&p1->d_inode->i_sb->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
for (p = p1; p->d_parent != p; p = p->d_parent) {
if (p->d_parent == p2) {
mutex_unlock(&p1->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (p1 != p2) {
mutex_unlock(&p2->d_inode->i_mutex);
- up(&p1->d_inode->i_sb->s_vfs_rename_sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&p1->d_inode->i_sb->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
}
}
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode, nd);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
goto exit;
}
+ if (IS_ERR(nd->intent.open.file)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
+ error = PTR_ERR(nd->intent.open.file);
+ goto exit_dput;
+ }
+
/* Negative dentry, just create the file */
if (!path.dentry->d_inode) {
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
DQUOT_INIT(dir);
error = dir->i_op->symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
}
error = dir->i_op->link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
mutex_unlock(&old_dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
if (!error)
- fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry->d_name.name);
+ fsnotify_create(dir, new_dentry);
return error;
}
* a) we can get into loop creation. Check is done in is_subdir().
* b) race potential - two innocent renames can create a loop together.
* That's where 4.4 screws up. Current fix: serialization on
- * sb->s_vfs_rename_sem. We might be more accurate, but that's another
+ * sb->s_vfs_rename_mutex. We might be more accurate, but that's another
* story.
* c) we have to lock _three_ objects - parents and victim (if it exists).
* And that - after we got ->i_mutex on parents (until then we don't know
* whether the target exists). Solution: try to be smart with locking
* order for inodes. We rely on the fact that tree topology may change
- * only under ->s_vfs_rename_sem _and_ that parent of the object we
+ * only under ->s_vfs_rename_mutex _and_ that parent of the object we
* move will be locked. Thus we can rank directories by the tree
* (ancestors first) and rank all non-directories after them.
* That works since everybody except rename does "lock parent, lookup,
- * lock child" and rename is under ->s_vfs_rename_sem.
+ * lock child" and rename is under ->s_vfs_rename_mutex.
* HOWEVER, it relies on the assumption that any object with ->lookup()
* has no more than 1 dentry. If "hybrid" objects will ever appear,
* we'd better make sure that there's no link(2) for them.
int err = -ENOMEM;
char *kaddr;
+retry:
page = find_or_create_page(mapping, 0, gfp_mask);
if (!page)
goto fail;
err = mapping->a_ops->prepare_write(NULL, page, 0, len-1);
+ if (err == AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE) {
+ page_cache_release(page);
+ goto retry;
+ }
if (err)
goto fail_map;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0);
memcpy(kaddr, symname, len-1);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr, KM_USER0);
- mapping->a_ops->commit_write(NULL, page, 0, len-1);
+ err = mapping->a_ops->commit_write(NULL, page, 0, len-1);
+ if (err == AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE) {
+ page_cache_release(page);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (err)
+ goto fail_map;
/*
* Notice that we are _not_ going to block here - end of page is
* unmapped, so this will only try to map the rest of page, see
*/
if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
err = mapping->a_ops->readpage(NULL, page);
- wait_on_page_locked(page);
+ if (err != AOP_TRUNCATED_PAGE)
+ wait_on_page_locked(page);
} else {
unlock_page(page);
}
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
dentry = file->f_dentry;
inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ audit_inode(NULL, inode, 0);
+
err = -EROFS;
if (IS_RDONLY(inode))
goto out_putf;
file = fget(fd);
if (file) {
- error = chown_common(file->f_dentry, user, group);
+ struct dentry * dentry;
+ dentry = file->f_dentry;
+ audit_inode(NULL, dentry->d_inode, 0);
+ error = chown_common(dentry, user, group);
fput(file);
}
return error;
* a fully instantiated struct file to the caller.
* This function is meant to be called from within a filesystem's
* lookup method.
+ * Beware of calling it for non-regular files! Those ->open methods might block
+ * (e.g. in fifo_open), leaving you with parent locked (and in case of fifo,
+ * leading to a deadlock, as nobody can open that fifo anymore, because
+ * another process to open fifo will block on locked parent when doing lookup).
* Note that in case of error, nd->intent.open.file is destroyed, but the
* path information remains valid.
* If the open callback is set to NULL, then the standard f_op->open()
fdt = files_fdtable(files);
fd = find_next_zero_bit(fdt->open_fds->fds_bits,
fdt->max_fdset,
- fdt->next_fd);
+ files->next_fd);
/*
* N.B. For clone tasks sharing a files structure, this test
FD_SET(fd, fdt->open_fds);
FD_CLR(fd, fdt->close_on_exec);
- fdt->next_fd = fd + 1;
+ files->next_fd = fd + 1;
#if 1
/* Sanity check */
if (fdt->fd[fd] != NULL) {
{
struct fdtable *fdt = files_fdtable(files);
__FD_CLR(fd, fdt->open_fds);
- if (fd < fdt->next_fd)
- fdt->next_fd = fd;
+ if (fd < files->next_fd)
+ files->next_fd = fd;
}
void fastcall put_unused_fd(unsigned int fd)
#include <linux/dnotify.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
+/*
+ * fsnotify_d_instantiate - instantiate a dentry for inode
+ * Called with dcache_lock held.
+ */
+static inline void fsnotify_d_instantiate(struct dentry *entry,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ inotify_d_instantiate(entry, inode);
+}
+
+/*
+ * fsnotify_d_move - entry has been moved
+ * Called with dcache_lock and entry->d_lock held.
+ */
+static inline void fsnotify_d_move(struct dentry *entry)
+{
+ inotify_d_move(entry);
+}
+
/*
* fsnotify_move - file old_name at old_dir was moved to new_name at new_dir
*/
if (source) {
inotify_inode_queue_event(source, IN_MOVE_SELF, 0, NULL);
}
+ audit_inode_child(old_name, source, old_dir->i_ino);
+ audit_inode_child(new_name, target, new_dir->i_ino);
}
/*
/*
* fsnotify_create - 'name' was linked in
*/
- static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+ static inline void fsnotify_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
- inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, name);
+ inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE, 0, dentry->d_name.name);
+ audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
}
/*
* fsnotify_mkdir - directory 'name' was created
*/
- static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, const char *name)
+ static inline void fsnotify_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
{
inode_dir_notify(inode, DN_CREATE);
- inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0, name);
+ inotify_inode_queue_event(inode, IN_CREATE | IN_ISDIR, 0,
+ dentry->d_name.name);
+ audit_inode_child(dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_inode, inode->i_ino);
}
/*
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
* @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecurity:
+ * Copy the security label associated with the ipc object into
+ * @buffer. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer
+ * required. @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return
+ * number of bytes used/required on success.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
* @msg_msg_alloc_security:
* @effective contains the effective capability set.
* @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
* @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ * @capable:
+ * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability.
+ * @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
+ * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
+ * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
* @acct:
* Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting. If
* accounting is being enabled, then @file refers to the open file used to
* @table contains the ctl_table structure for the sysctl variable.
* @op contains the operation (001 = search, 002 = write, 004 = read).
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @capable:
- * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability.
- * @tsk contains the task_struct for the process.
- * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
- * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
* @syslog:
* Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
* logging to the console.
kernel_cap_t * effective,
kernel_cap_t * inheritable,
kernel_cap_t * permitted);
+ int (*capable) (struct task_struct * tsk, int cap);
int (*acct) (struct file * file);
int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table * table, int op);
- int (*capable) (struct task_struct * tsk, int cap);
int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block * sb);
int (*quota_on) (struct dentry * dentry);
int (*syslog) (int type);
int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, char *name);
- int (*inode_getsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
+ const char *(*inode_xattr_getsuffix) (void);
+ int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err);
int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
+ int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
int (*socket_setsockopt) (struct socket * sock, int level, int optname);
int (*socket_shutdown) (struct socket * sock, int how);
int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb) (struct sock * sk, struct sk_buff * skb);
- int (*socket_getpeersec) (struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+ int (*socket_getpeersec_stream) (struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+ int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram) (struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
int (*sk_alloc_security) (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
void (*sk_free_security) (struct sock *sk);
unsigned int (*sk_getsid) (struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir);
security_ops->capset_set (target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
+static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+ return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
+}
+
static inline int security_acct (struct file *file)
{
return security_ops->acct (file);
return security_ops->inode_removexattr (dentry, name);
}
- static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+ static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+ {
+ return security_ops->inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+ }
+
+ static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
return 0;
return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag);
}
+ static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+ {
+ return security_ops->ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, buffer, size);
+ }
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security (msg);
cap_capset_set (target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
+static inline int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+ return cap_capable(tsk, cap);
+}
+
static inline int security_acct (struct file *file)
{
return 0;
return cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
}
- static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+ static inline const char *security_inode_xattr_getsuffix (void)
+ {
+ return NULL ;
+ }
+
+ static inline int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return 0;
}
+ static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+ {
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return 0;
return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb (sk, skb);
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+ return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen, len);
+}
+
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getpeersec(sock, optval, optlen, len);
+ return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb, secdata, seclen);
}
static inline int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
ret = -EEXIST;
} else {
msq = msg_lock(id);
- if(msq==NULL)
- BUG();
+ BUG_ON(msq==NULL);
if (ipcperms(&msq->q_perm, msgflg))
ret = -EACCES;
else {
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_msqid_from_user (&setbuf, buf, version))
return -EFAULT;
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
break;
case IPC_RMID:
break;
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_SET:
{
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+ goto out_unlock_up;
+
err = -EPERM;
if (setbuf.qbytes > msg_ctlmnb && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
goto out_unlock_up;
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode)))
- return err;
down(&shm_ids.sem);
shp = shm_lock(shmid);
err=-EINVAL;
if(shp==NULL)
goto out_up;
+ if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm))))
+ goto out_unlock_up;
err = shm_checkid(shp,shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock_up;
loff_t size = 0;
int retval = -EINVAL;
+ if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ return retval;
+
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
/*
obj-$(CONFIG_CPUSETS) += cpuset.o
obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += configs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_STOP_MACHINE) += stop_machine.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o
+ obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSFS) += ksysfs.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_HARDIRQS) += irq/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP) += seccomp.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST) += rcutorture.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_RELAY) += relay.o
ifneq ($(CONFIG_SCHED_NO_NO_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER),y)
# According to Alan Modra <alan@linuxcare.com.au>, the -fno-omit-frame-pointer is
* Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
*
* Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
+ * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation
* All Rights Reserved.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
* okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
*
+ * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
+ * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
+ *
+ * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
+ * filesystem information.
+ *
+ * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
+ * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <asm/atomic.h>
+ #include <asm/types.h>
+ #include <linux/fs.h>
+ #include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
- #include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
+ #include <linux/security.h>
+ #include <linux/list.h>
+ #include <linux/tty.h>
+
+ #include "audit.h"
- /* 0 = no checking
- 1 = put_count checking
- 2 = verbose put_count checking
- */
- #define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+ extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[];
/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
extern int audit_enabled;
* path_lookup. */
#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
- /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
- a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
- the syscall filter. */
- enum audit_state {
- AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
- * No syscall-specific audit records can
- * be generated. */
- AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * but don't necessarily fill it in at
- * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
- * instead). */
- AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * and always fill it in at syscall
- * entry time. This makes a full
- * syscall record available if some
- * other part of the kernel decides it
- * should be recorded. */
- AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
- * always fill it in at syscall entry
- * time, and always write out the audit
- * record at syscall exit time. */
- };
-
/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
* we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
* pointers at syscall exit time).
struct audit_names {
const char *name;
unsigned long ino;
+ unsigned long pino;
dev_t dev;
umode_t mode;
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- unsigned flags;
+ char *ctx;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
+ char *ctx;
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
#endif
};
- /* Public API */
- /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
- * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
- * syscall exit time. */
- static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
- LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
- #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
- #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
- #endif
- };
-
- struct audit_entry {
- struct list_head list;
- struct rcu_head rcu;
- struct audit_rule rule;
- };
-
- extern int audit_pid;
-
- /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD. */
- static inline int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
- {
- int i;
-
- if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
- && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
- && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
- return -1;
- if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
- return -1;
- if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -1;
-
- d->flags = s->flags;
- d->action = s->action;
- d->field_count = s->field_count;
- for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
- d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
- d->values[i] = s->values[i];
- }
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
- * audit_add_rule during AUDIT_ADD and
- * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
- static inline int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
- {
- int i;
-
- if (a->flags != b->flags)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->action != b->action)
- return 1;
-
- if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
- return 1;
-
- for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
- if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
- || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
- return 1;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
- if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
- static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
- {
- struct audit_entry *entry;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * addition routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(entry, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &entry->rule)) {
- return -EEXIST;
- }
- }
-
- if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
- return -ENOMEM;
- if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, rule)) {
- kfree(entry);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
- entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- } else {
- list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- static inline void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
- {
- struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
- kfree(e);
- }
-
- /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
- * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
- * audit_netlink_sem. */
- static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
- struct list_head *list)
- {
- struct audit_entry *e;
-
- /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
- * deletion routine. */
- list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
- if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
- list_del_rcu(&e->list);
- call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
- }
-
- static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
- {
- int pid, seq;
- int *dest = _dest;
- struct audit_entry *entry;
- int i;
-
- pid = dest[0];
- seq = dest[1];
- kfree(dest);
-
- down(&audit_netlink_sem);
-
- /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
- always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
- for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
- list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
- &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
- }
- audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
-
- up(&audit_netlink_sem);
- return 0;
- }
-
- int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
- uid_t loginuid)
- {
- struct task_struct *tsk;
- int *dest;
- int err = 0;
- unsigned listnr;
-
- switch (type) {
- case AUDIT_LIST:
- /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
- * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
- * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
- * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
- * trying to _send_ the stuff */
-
- dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!dest)
- return -ENOMEM;
- dest[0] = pid;
- dest[1] = seq;
-
- tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
- if (IS_ERR(tsk)) {
- kfree(dest);
- err = PTR_ERR(tsk);
- }
- break;
- case AUDIT_ADD:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_add_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- case AUDIT_DEL:
- listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
- if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
- if (!err)
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
- break;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return err;
- }
/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
* otherwise. */
static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_krule *rule,
struct audit_context *ctx,
enum audit_state *state)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
int result = 0;
- switch (field) {
+ switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = (tsk->pid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_UID:
- result = (tsk->uid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EUID:
- result = (tsk->euid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUID:
- result = (tsk->suid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSUID:
- result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_GID:
- result = (tsk->gid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EGID:
- result = (tsk->egid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SGID:
- result = (tsk->sgid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_FSGID:
- result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PERS:
- result = (tsk->personality == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARCH:
- if (ctx)
- result = (ctx->arch == value);
+ if (ctx)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_EXIT:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
- result = (ctx->return_code == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
- if (value)
- result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
+ if (f->val)
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
else
- result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_FAILURE);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
}
break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+ if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_INODE:
if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
+ if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) ||
+ audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) {
++result;
break;
}
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
result = 0;
if (ctx)
- result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
case AUDIT_ARG3:
if (ctx)
- result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
+ result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
break;
}
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
- result = !result;
if (!result)
return 0;
}
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
- * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
*/
static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx,
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
- && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return state;
- }
- }
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
- }
-
- static int audit_filter_user_rules(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb,
- struct audit_rule *rule,
- enum audit_state *state)
- {
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
- u32 value = rule->values[i];
- int result = 0;
-
- switch (field) {
- case AUDIT_PID:
- result = (cb->creds.pid == value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_UID:
- result = (cb->creds.uid == value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_GID:
- result = (cb->creds.gid == value);
- break;
- case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
- result = (cb->loginuid == value);
- break;
- }
-
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
- result = !result;
- if (!result)
- return 0;
- }
- switch (rule->action) {
- case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
- case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
- case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-
- int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type)
- {
- struct audit_entry *e;
- enum audit_state state;
- int ret = 1;
-
- rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
- if (audit_filter_user_rules(cb, &e->rule, &state)) {
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
- ret = 0;
- break;
+ int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+ int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+ if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+ && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return state;
+ }
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
-
- return ret; /* Audit by default */
+ return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
if (context->auditable
||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
" name_count=%d put_count=%d"
" ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
- __LINE__,
+ __FILE__, __LINE__,
context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
context->name_count, context->put_count,
context->ino_count);
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name);
+ context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
+ }
dump_stack();
return;
}
context->ino_count = 0;
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
+ context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
+ kfree(p);
if (context->names[i].name)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
+ }
context->name_count = 0;
if (context->pwd)
dput(context->pwd);
dput(axi->dentry);
mntput(axi->mnt);
}
+ if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ if (axi->ctx)
+ kfree(axi->ctx);
+ }
+
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
}
return context;
}
- /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
+ /**
+ * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
+ * @tsk: task
+ *
+ * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
* if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
* specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
- * needed. */
+ * needed.
+ */
int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
- static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+ static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+ {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ ssize_t len = 0;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ if (len != -EINVAL)
+ goto error_path;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len);
+ if (len < 0 )
+ goto error_path;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
+ return;
+
+ error_path:
+ if (ctx)
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
if (!mm)
return;
+ /*
+ * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
+ * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
+ */
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
vma = mm->mmap;
while (vma) {
vma = vma->vm_next;
}
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
}
static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
int i;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+ const char *tty;
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
+ if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = current->signal->tty->name;
+ else
+ tty = "(none)";
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
" pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
" euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
- " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
+ " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->uid,
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
- context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
- audit_log_task_info(ab);
+ context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
}
}
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+ unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
+ unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
+
ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
- if (context->names[i].name) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ if (context->names[i].name)
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
- }
- audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
-
- if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
- audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
- " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
- context->names[i].ino,
- MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
- MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
- context->names[i].mode,
- context->names[i].uid,
- context->names[i].gid,
- MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
+
+ if (pino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino);
+ if (ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino);
+ if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+ " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
+ context->names[i].mode,
+ context->names[i].uid,
+ context->names[i].gid,
+ MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
+ if (context->names[i].ctx) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
+ context->names[i].ctx);
+ }
+
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
- /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
- * __put_task_struct. */
+ /**
+ * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
+ * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
+ *
+ * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ */
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- task_lock(tsk);
+ /*
+ * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
+ * then the task has no external references anymore, and
+ * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
+ * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
+ * contexts as well, via RCU.)
+ */
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
- task_unlock(tsk);
-
if (likely(!context))
return;
audit_free_context(context);
}
- /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
+ /**
+ * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @arch: architecture type
+ * @major: major syscall type (function)
+ * @a1: additional syscall register 1
+ * @a2: additional syscall register 2
+ * @a3: additional syscall register 3
+ * @a4: additional syscall register 4
+ *
+ * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
* audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
* filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
* per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
- * be written). */
+ * be written).
+ */
void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
BUG_ON(!context);
- /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
+ /*
+ * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
* calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
* with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
* architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
*
* i386 no
* x86_64 no
- * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
+ * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
*
* This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
* (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
if (context->in_syscall) {
struct audit_context *newctx;
- #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
- /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
- if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
- return;
- #endif
#if AUDIT_DEBUG
printk(KERN_ERR
"audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
}
- /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
+ /**
+ * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
+ * @tsk: task being audited
+ * @valid: success/failure flag
+ * @return_code: syscall return value
+ *
+ * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
* auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
- * free the names stored from getname(). */
+ * free the names stored from getname().
+ */
void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
{
struct audit_context *context;
put_task_struct(tsk);
}
- /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
+ /**
+ * audit_getname - add a name to the list
+ * @name: name to add
+ *
+ * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
+ */
void audit_getname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
}
- /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
- * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
- * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
- * exit. */
+ /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
+ * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
+ *
+ * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
+ * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
+ * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
+ */
void audit_putname(const char *name)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
context->names[i].name,
- context->names[i].name);
+ context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
}
#endif
__putname(name);
#endif
}
- /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
- * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
- void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
+ void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (!suffix)
+ goto ret;
+
+ len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ goto ret;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
+ context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
+ goto ret;
+
+ error_path:
+ if (ctx)
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
+ ret:
+ return;
+ }
+
+
+ /**
+ * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
+ * @name: name being audited
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup())
+ *
+ * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
+ */
+ void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
{
int idx;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
++context->ino_count;
#endif
}
- context->names[idx].flags = flags;
- context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+ if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) &&
+ (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) {
+ context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino;
+ } else {
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
+ context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
+ * @dname: inode's dentry name
+ * @inode: inode being audited
+ * @pino: inode number of dentry parent
+ *
+ * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
+ * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
+ * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
+ * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
+ * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
+ * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
+ * unsuccessful attempts.
+ */
+ void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode,
+ unsigned long pino)
+ {
+ int idx;
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (!context->in_syscall)
+ return;
+
+ /* determine matching parent */
+ if (dname)
+ for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++)
+ if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) {
+ const char *n;
+ const char *name = context->names[idx].name;
+ int dlen = strlen(dname);
+ int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0;
+
+ if (nlen < dlen)
+ continue;
+
+ /* disregard trailing slashes */
+ n = name + nlen - 1;
+ while ((*n == '/') && (n > name))
+ n--;
+
+ /* find last path component */
+ n = n - dlen + 1;
+ if (n < name)
+ continue;
+ else if (n > name) {
+ if (*--n != '/')
+ continue;
+ else
+ n++;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0)
+ goto update_context;
+ }
+
+ /* catch-all in case match not found */
+ idx = context->name_count++;
+ context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+ context->names[idx].pino = pino;
+ #if AUDIT_DEBUG
+ context->ino_count++;
+ #endif
+
+ update_context:
+ if (inode) {
+ context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
+ context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+ context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
+ context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
+ context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
+ context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+ audit_inode_context(idx, inode);
+ }
}
+ /**
+ * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
+ * @ctx: audit_context for the task
+ * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
+ * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
+ *
+ * Also sets the context as auditable.
+ */
void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
{
ctx->auditable = 1;
}
+ /**
+ * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
+ * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
+ * @loginuid: loginuid value
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ *
+ * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
+ */
int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
{
if (task->audit_context) {
return 0;
}
+ /**
+ * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context
+ * @ctx: the audit_context
+ *
+ * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL.
+ */
uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
}
- int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+ static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+ {
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (likely(!context))
+ return NULL;
+
+ len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
+ if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ goto ret;
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto error_path;
+
+ return ctx;
+
+ error_path:
+ kfree(ctx);
+ audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
+ ret:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * @qbytes: msgq bytes
+ * @uid: msgq user id
+ * @gid: msgq group id
+ * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
if (likely(!context))
return 0;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!ax)
return -ENOMEM;
ax->uid = uid;
ax->gid = gid;
ax->mode = mode;
+ ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
return 0;
}
+ /**
+ * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
+ * @nargs: number of args
+ * @args: args array
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
{
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
return 0;
}
+ /**
+ * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
+ * @len: data length in user space
+ * @a: data address in kernel space
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
{
struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
return 0;
}
+ /**
+ * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions
+ * @dentry: dentry to record
+ * @mnt: mnt to record
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ *
+ * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit()
+ */
int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
return 0;
}
+ /**
+ * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
+ * @sig: signal value
+ * @t: task being signaled
+ *
+ * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
+ * and uid that is doing that.
+ */
void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
{
extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
}
}
}
-
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/netpoll.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
-#ifdef CONFIG_NET_RADIO
-#include <linux/wireless.h> /* Note : will define WIRELESS_EXT */
+#include <linux/wireless.h>
#include <net/iw_handler.h>
-#endif /* CONFIG_NET_RADIO */
#include <asm/current.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
/*
* The list of packet types we will receive (as opposed to discard)
int unregister_netdevice_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
- return notifier_chain_unregister(&netdev_chain, nb);
+ int err;
+
+ rtnl_lock();
+ err = notifier_chain_unregister(&netdev_chain, nb);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+ return err;
}
/**
{
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
- if (dev->master)
+ if (dev->master) {
+ /*
+ * On bonding slaves other than the currently active
+ * slave, suppress duplicates except for 802.3ad
+ * ETH_P_SLOW and alb non-mcast/bcast.
+ */
+ if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE) {
+ if (dev->master->priv_flags & IFF_MASTER_ALB) {
+ if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_BROADCAST &&
+ skb->pkt_type != PACKET_MULTICAST)
+ goto keep;
+ }
+
+ if (dev->master->priv_flags & IFF_MASTER_8023AD &&
+ skb->protocol == __constant_htons(ETH_P_SLOW))
+ goto keep;
+
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+keep:
skb->dev = dev->master;
+ }
return dev;
}
orig_dev = skb_bond(skb);
+ if (!orig_dev)
+ return NET_RX_DROP;
+
__get_cpu_var(netdev_rx_stat).total++;
skb->h.raw = skb->nh.raw = skb->data;
if (dev->quota <= 0 || dev->poll(dev, &budget)) {
netpoll_poll_unlock(have);
local_irq_disable();
- list_del(&dev->poll_list);
- list_add_tail(&dev->poll_list, &queue->poll_list);
+ list_move_tail(&dev->poll_list, &queue->poll_list);
if (dev->quota < 0)
dev->quota += dev->weight;
else
.release = seq_release,
};
-#ifdef WIRELESS_EXT
+#ifdef CONFIG_WIRELESS_EXT
extern int wireless_proc_init(void);
#else
#define wireless_proc_init() 0
printk(KERN_INFO "device %s %s promiscuous mode\n",
dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) ? "entered" :
"left");
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS,
+ "dev=%s prom=%d old_prom=%d auid=%u",
+ dev->name, (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC),
+ (old_flags & IFF_PROMISC),
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
}
}
flags = (dev->flags & ~(IFF_PROMISC |
IFF_ALLMULTI |
- IFF_RUNNING)) |
+ IFF_RUNNING |
+ IFF_LOWER_UP |
+ IFF_DORMANT)) |
(dev->gflags & (IFF_PROMISC |
IFF_ALLMULTI));
- if (netif_running(dev) && netif_carrier_ok(dev))
- flags |= IFF_RUNNING;
+ if (netif_running(dev)) {
+ if (netif_oper_up(dev))
+ flags |= IFF_RUNNING;
+ if (netif_carrier_ok(dev))
+ flags |= IFF_LOWER_UP;
+ if (netif_dormant(dev))
+ flags |= IFF_DORMANT;
+ }
return flags;
}
*/
if (cmd == SIOCGIFCONF) {
- rtnl_shlock();
+ rtnl_lock();
ret = dev_ifconf((char __user *) arg);
- rtnl_shunlock();
+ rtnl_unlock();
return ret;
}
if (cmd == SIOCGIFNAME)
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
-#ifdef WIRELESS_EXT
+#ifdef CONFIG_WIRELESS_EXT
/* Take care of Wireless Extensions */
if (cmd >= SIOCIWFIRST && cmd <= SIOCIWLAST) {
/* If command is `set a parameter', or
ret = -EFAULT;
return ret;
}
-#endif /* WIRELESS_EXT */
+#endif /* CONFIG_WIRELESS_EXT */
return -EINVAL;
}
}
rebroadcast_time = warning_time = jiffies;
while (atomic_read(&dev->refcnt) != 0) {
if (time_after(jiffies, rebroadcast_time + 1 * HZ)) {
- rtnl_shlock();
+ rtnl_lock();
/* Rebroadcast unregister notification */
notifier_call_chain(&netdev_chain,
linkwatch_run_queue();
}
- rtnl_shunlock();
+ __rtnl_unlock();
rebroadcast_time = jiffies;
}
* 2) Since we run with the RTNL semaphore not held, we can sleep
* safely in order to wait for the netdev refcnt to drop to zero.
*/
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(net_todo_run_mutex);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(net_todo_run_mutex);
void netdev_run_todo(void)
{
struct list_head list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(list);
/* Need to guard against multiple cpu's getting out of order. */
- down(&net_todo_run_mutex);
+ mutex_lock(&net_todo_run_mutex);
/* Not safe to do outside the semaphore. We must not return
* until all unregister events invoked by the local processor
}
out:
- up(&net_todo_run_mutex);
+ mutex_unlock(&net_todo_run_mutex);
}
/**
return 0;
}
- static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+ static int dummy_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return 0;
}
+ static const char *dummy_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+ {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
return 0;
}
+ static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+ {
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
return 0;
}
-static int dummy_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+ return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata,
+ u32 *seclen)
{
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_xattr_getsuffix);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
- set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, sk_getsid);
static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
+static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
+
+ /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
+ length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
+ static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
+ {
+ char *context;
+ unsigned len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (!buffer || !size)
+ goto getsecurity_exit;
+
+ if (size < len) {
+ len = -ERANGE;
+ goto getsecurity_exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(buffer, context, len);
+
+ getsecurity_exit:
+ kfree(context);
+ return len;
+ }
+
/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
- isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
+ isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
if (!isec)
return -ENOMEM;
+ memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
isec->inode = inode;
spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
inode->i_security = NULL;
- kfree(isec);
+ kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
}
static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
- struct inode_security_struct *isec;
u32 newsid, clen;
int rc;
char *namep = NULL, *context;
tsec = current->security;
dsec = dir->i_security;
sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
- isec = inode->i_security;
if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
- if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (name) {
return -EACCES;
}
+ static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
+ {
+ return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
+ }
+
/*
* Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
* getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
*
* Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
*/
- static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
+ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- char *context;
- unsigned len;
- int rc;
-
- if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) {
- rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- /* Probe for required buffer size */
- if (!buffer || !size) {
- rc = len;
- goto out_free;
- }
- if (size < len) {
- rc = -ERANGE;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (err > 0) {
- if ((len == err) && !(memcmp(context, buffer, len))) {
- /* Don't need to canonicalize value */
- rc = err;
- goto out_free;
- }
- memset(buffer, 0, size);
- }
- memcpy(buffer, context, len);
- rc = len;
- out_free:
- kfree(context);
- out:
- return rc;
+ return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
}
static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
return err;
}
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
int err = 0;
char *scontext;
u32 scontext_len;
struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ u32 peer_sid = 0;
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
- if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+
+ /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
+ if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+ ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+ }
+ else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+ peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
+
+ if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
goto out;
}
- ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-
- err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+ err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+
if (err)
goto out;
return err;
}
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ u32 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+
+ if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, secdata, seclen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
+ static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
+ {
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+
+ return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
+ }
+
/* module stacking operations */
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- u32 sid, len;
- char *context;
+ u32 sid;
int error;
if (current != p) {
return error;
}
- if (!size)
- return -ERANGE;
-
tsec = p->security;
if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
if (!sid)
return 0;
- error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
- if (error)
- return error;
- if (len > size) {
- kfree(context);
- return -ERANGE;
- }
- memcpy(value, context, len);
- kfree(context);
- return len;
+ return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
}
static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
.inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
.inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
.inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
+ .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
.inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
.inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
+ .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
.msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
.msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
.socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
.socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
.socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
- .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
+ .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
.sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
.sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
.sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security,
tsec = current->security;
tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
+ sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
avc_init();
original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
{ XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ XFRM_MSG_UPDSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_FLUSHSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_FLUSHPOLICY, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_NEWAE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { XFRM_MSG_GETAE, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
{ AUDIT_LIST, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
{ AUDIT_ADD, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ AUDIT_DEL, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_LIST_RULES, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV },
+ { AUDIT_ADD_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_DEL_RULE, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
{ AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY },
{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
};
break;
case SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET:
- if (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
- nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) {
+ if ((nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG &&
+ nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG) ||
+ (nlmsg_type >= AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 &&
+ nlmsg_type <= AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2)) {
*perm = NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY;
} else {
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_audit_perms,
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+ #include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/semaphore.h>
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(sel_sem);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
/* global data for booleans */
static struct dentry *bool_dir = NULL;
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETENFORCE);
if (length)
goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ "enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u", new_value,
+ selinux_enforcing,
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
selinux_enforcing = new_value;
if (selinux_enforcing)
avc_ss_reset(0);
length = selinux_disable();
if (length < 0)
goto out;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
+ "selinux=0 auid=%u",
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
}
length = count;
ssize_t length;
void *data = NULL;
- down(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY);
if (length)
length = ret;
else
length = count;
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
+ "policy loaded auid=%u",
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
out:
- up(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
vfree(data);
return length;
}
{
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
- ssize_t end;
ssize_t ret;
int cur_enforcing;
struct inode *inode;
- down(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
ret = -EFAULT;
length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
bool_pending_values[inode->i_ino - BOOL_INO_OFFSET]);
- if (length < 0) {
- ret = length;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (*ppos >= length) {
- ret = 0;
- goto out;
- }
- if (count + *ppos > length)
- count = length - *ppos;
- end = count + *ppos;
- if (copy_to_user(buf, (char *) page + *ppos, count)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
- *ppos = end;
- ret = count;
+ ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
out:
- up(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
if (page)
free_page((unsigned long)page);
return ret;
int new_value;
struct inode *inode;
- down(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
if (length)
length = count;
out:
- up(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
if (page)
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
ssize_t length = -EFAULT;
int new_value;
- down(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
length = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETBOOL);
if (length)
length = count;
out:
- up(&sel_sem);
+ mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
if (page)
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return length;
return ret;
err:
kfree(values);
- d_genocide(dir);
+ sel_remove_bools(dir);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
if (!dentry) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
if (!inode) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ goto out;
}
inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
d_add(dentry, inode);
}
out:
return ret;
-err:
- d_genocide(dir);
- goto out;
}
-static int sel_make_dir(struct super_block *sb, struct dentry *dentry)
+static int sel_make_dir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int ret = 0;
struct inode *inode;
- inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->i_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
if (!inode) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
+ /* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
+ inode->i_nlink++;
d_add(dentry, inode);
+ /* bump link count on parent directory, too */
+ dir->i_nlink++;
out:
return ret;
}
{
int ret;
struct dentry *dentry;
- struct inode *inode;
+ struct inode *inode, *root_inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
static struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
};
ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto err;
+
+ root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME);
- if (!dentry)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
- inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
- if (!inode)
- goto out;
- inode->i_op = &simple_dir_inode_operations;
- inode->i_fop = &simple_dir_operations;
- d_add(dentry, inode);
- bool_dir = dentry;
- ret = sel_make_bools();
+ ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
if (ret)
- goto out;
+ goto err;
+
+ bool_dir = dentry;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, NULL_FILE_NAME);
- if (!dentry)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
- if (!inode)
- goto out;
+ if (!inode) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
isec = (struct inode_security_struct*)inode->i_security;
isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
selinux_null = dentry;
dentry = d_alloc_name(sb->s_root, "avc");
- if (!dentry)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!dentry) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err;
+ }
- ret = sel_make_dir(sb, dentry);
+ ret = sel_make_dir(root_inode, dentry);
if (ret)
- goto out;
+ goto err;
ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
if (ret)
- goto out;
-
- return 0;
+ goto err;
out:
- dput(dentry);
+ return ret;
+err:
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: failed while creating inodes\n", __FUNCTION__);
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
static struct super_block *sel_get_sb(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <asm/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+
#include "flask.h"
#include "avc.h"
#include "avc_ss.h"
#define POLICY_RDUNLOCK read_unlock(&policy_rwlock)
#define POLICY_WRUNLOCK write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock)
-static DECLARE_MUTEX(load_sem);
-#define LOAD_LOCK down(&load_sem)
-#define LOAD_UNLOCK up(&load_sem)
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(load_mutex);
+#define LOAD_LOCK mutex_lock(&load_mutex)
+#define LOAD_UNLOCK mutex_unlock(&load_mutex)
static struct sidtab sidtab;
struct policydb policydb;
goto out;
}
- printk(KERN_INFO "security: committed booleans { ");
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u",
+ policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
+ !!values[i],
+ policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+ audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
+ }
if (values[i]) {
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
} else {
policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
}
- if (i != 0)
- printk(", ");
- printk("%s:%d", policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i],
- policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state);
}
- printk(" }\n");
for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
projects / firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git / commitdiff