random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store
authorTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Thu, 22 Dec 2011 21:28:01 +0000 (16:28 -0500)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Wed, 15 Aug 2012 19:04:11 +0000 (12:04 -0700)
commitd191959fa812fadb86b52f16aa09a49fe6db98dd
treeb490805d758febadcd0316d2417bfbd6d3d56432
parentbe0052b8995dfa8d43a94badd54254e8cfc59471
random: Use arch-specific RNG to initialize the entropy store

commit 3e88bdff1c65145f7ba297ccec69c774afe4c785 upstream.

If there is an architecture-specific random number generator (such as
RDRAND for Intel architectures), use it to initialize /dev/random's
entropy stores.  Even in the worst case, if RDRAND is something like
AES(NSA_KEY, counter++), it won't hurt, and it will definitely help
against any other adversaries.

Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1324589281-31931-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
drivers/char/random.c