* and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <asm/syscall.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
#include "audit.h"
/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
+/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
+#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
+
/* number of audit rules */
int audit_n_rules;
/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
-struct audit_aux_data_execve {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- int argc;
- int envc;
- struct mm_struct *mm;
-};
-
struct audit_aux_data_pids {
struct audit_aux_data d;
pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
};
-struct audit_aux_data_capset {
- struct audit_aux_data d;
- pid_t pid;
- struct audit_cap_data cap;
-};
-
struct audit_tree_refs {
struct audit_tree_refs *next;
struct audit_chunk *c[31];
};
-static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
-{
- int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
- if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
- n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
- return n & mask;
-}
-
static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
{
unsigned n;
return 0;
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- if ((n->ino != -1) &&
+ if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
return 1;
}
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
struct audit_names *n;
int result = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
- result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
+ pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
+ result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
break;
case AUDIT_PPID:
if (ctx) {
if (!ctx->ppid)
- ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
+ ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
}
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
+ break;
case AUDIT_UID:
result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
break;
break;
case AUDIT_INODE:
if (name)
- result = (name->ino == f->val);
+ result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
- result = 0;
- if (ctx)
- result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
+ result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
break;
case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
+static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+{
+ int word, bit;
+
+ if (val > 0xffffffff)
+ return false;
+
+ word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
+ if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
+
+ return rule->mask[word] & bit;
+}
+
/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
* audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
* also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
rcu_read_lock();
if (!list_empty(list)) {
- int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
&state, false)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_names *n,
struct audit_context *ctx) {
- int word, bit;
int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
- word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
- bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
-
if (list_empty(list))
return 0;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
- if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
ctx->current_state = state;
return 1;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
-static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
+/* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
long return_code)
{
return context;
}
+static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ kfree(context->proctitle.value);
+ context->proctitle.value = NULL;
+ context->proctitle.len = 0;
+}
+
static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
{
struct audit_names *n, *next;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
- if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
- int i = 0;
-
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
- " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
- " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__,
- context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
- context->name_count, context->put_count,
- context->ino_count);
- list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
- n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
- }
- dump_stack();
- return;
- }
-#endif
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- context->put_count = 0;
- context->ino_count = 0;
-#endif
-
list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
list_del(&n->list);
- if (n->name && n->name_put)
- final_putname(n->name);
+ if (n->name)
+ putname(n->name);
if (n->should_free)
kfree(n);
}
return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
- if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
+ if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
return 0;
+ }
if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
kfree(key);
audit_free_aux(context);
kfree(context->filterkey);
kfree(context->sockaddr);
+ audit_proctitle_free(context);
kfree(context);
}
* for strings that are too long, we should not have created
* any.
*/
- if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
- WARN_ON(1);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
return -1;
}
}
static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
- struct audit_buffer **ab,
- struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
+ struct audit_buffer **ab)
{
int i, len;
size_t len_sent = 0;
const char __user *p;
char *buf;
- if (axi->mm != current->mm)
- return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
+ p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
- p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
-
- audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
+ audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
/*
* we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
*/
buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
- audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
+ audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
return;
}
- for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
&len_sent, p, buf);
if (len <= 0)
audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
context->mmap.flags);
break; }
+ case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
+ audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
+ break; }
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
+{
+ char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
+ while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
+ end--;
+
+ /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
+ len = end - proctitle + 1;
+ len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
+ return len;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_context *context)
+{
+ int res;
+ char *buf;
+ char *msg = "(null)";
+ int len = strlen(msg);
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
+ if (!ab)
+ return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
+
+ /* Not cached */
+ if (!context->proctitle.value) {
+ buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto out;
+ /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
+ res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
+ if (res == 0) {
+ kfree(buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
+ if (res == 0) {
+ kfree(buf);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context->proctitle.value = buf;
+ context->proctitle.len = res;
}
+ msg = context->proctitle.value;
+ len = context->proctitle.len;
+out:
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
switch (aux->type) {
- case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
- struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
- audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
- break; }
-
case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
}
i = 0;
- list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
+ list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
+ if (n->hidden)
+ continue;
audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
{
struct audit_context *context;
- context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
+ context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
if (!context)
return;
/**
* audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
- * @arch: architecture type
* @major: major syscall type (function)
* @a1: additional syscall register 1
* @a2: additional syscall register 2
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written).
*/
-void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
- unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
- unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
+void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
+ unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
if (!audit_enabled)
return;
- context->arch = arch;
+ context->arch = syscall_get_arch();
context->major = major;
context->argv[0] = a1;
context->argv[1] = a2;
else
success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
- context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
+ context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code);
if (!context)
return;
if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
return;
if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+ pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
audit_set_auditable(context);
audit_put_chunk(chunk);
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
rcu_read_lock();
seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
for(;;) {
- struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
struct audit_chunk *chunk;
chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
goto retry;
}
/* too bad */
- printk(KERN_WARNING
- "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
+ pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
audit_set_auditable(context);
return;
aname->should_free = true;
}
- aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
aname->type = type;
list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
context->name_count++;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- context->ino_count++;
-#endif
return aname;
}
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
if (!n->name)
continue;
- if (n->name->uptr == uptr)
+ if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
+ n->name->refcnt++;
return n->name;
+ }
}
return NULL;
}
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
struct audit_names *n;
- if (!context->in_syscall) {
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
- dump_stack();
-#endif
+ if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
- }
-
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
- BUG_ON(!name->name);
-#endif
n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
if (!n)
n->name = name;
n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
- n->name_put = true;
name->aname = n;
+ name->refcnt++;
if (!context->pwd.dentry)
get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
}
-/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
- * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
- *
- * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
- * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
- * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
- */
-void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
-{
- struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-
- BUG_ON(!context);
- if (!context->in_syscall) {
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
- if (context->name_count) {
- struct audit_names *n;
- int i = 0;
-
- list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
- printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
- n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
- }
-#endif
- final_putname(name);
- }
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- else {
- ++context->put_count;
- if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
- " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
- " put_count=%d\n",
- __FILE__, __LINE__,
- context->serial, context->major,
- context->in_syscall, name->name,
- context->name_count, context->put_count);
- dump_stack();
- }
- }
-#endif
-}
-
/**
* __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
* @name: name being audited
* @dentry: dentry being audited
- * @parent: does this dentry represent the parent?
+ * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
*/
void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
- unsigned int parent)
+ unsigned int flags)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
struct audit_names *n;
+ bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
if (!context->in_syscall)
return;
if (!name)
goto out_alloc;
-#if AUDIT_DEBUG
- /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
- BUG_ON(!name->name);
-#endif
/*
* If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
* just use it directly if the type is correct.
}
list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
- /* does the name pointer match? */
- if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name)
+ if (n->ino) {
+ /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
+ if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
+ n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
+ continue;
+ } else if (n->name) {
+ /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
+ if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
+ continue;
+ } else
+ /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
continue;
/* match the correct record type */
}
out_alloc:
- /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
- * anonymous entry.
- */
- n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
+ /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
+ n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
if (!n)
return;
+ if (name) {
+ n->name = name;
+ name->refcnt++;
+ }
+
out:
if (parent) {
n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
+ if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
+ n->hidden = true;
} else {
n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
}
+void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
+{
+ __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
+}
+
/**
* __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
* @parent: inode of dentry parent
const unsigned char type)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
/* look for a parent entry first */
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
- if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
+ if (!n->name ||
+ (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
+ n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
continue;
- if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
- !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
+ if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
+ !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
+ n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
+ if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
+ n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
found_parent = n;
break;
}
/* is there a matching child entry? */
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
/* can only match entries that have a name */
- if (!n->name || n->type != type)
- continue;
-
- /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */
- if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name))
+ if (!n->name ||
+ (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
continue;
if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
found_parent ?
found_parent->name_len :
AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) {
+ if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
+ n->type = type;
found_child = n;
break;
}
if (found_parent) {
found_child->name = found_parent->name;
found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
- /* don't call __putname() */
- found_child->name_put = false;
+ found_child->name->refcnt++;
}
}
+
if (inode)
audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
else
- found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
+ found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
+static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
+{
+ /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
+ if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
+ return 0;
+ /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
+ if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* it is set, you need permission */
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ return -EPERM;
+ /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
+ if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
+ unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
+ int rc)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
+ oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
+ loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
+ oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
/**
* audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
* @loginuid: loginuid value
int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
{
struct task_struct *task = current;
- struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
- unsigned int sessionid;
+ unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1;
+ kuid_t oldloginuid;
+ int rc;
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
- if (audit_loginuid_set(task))
- return -EPERM;
-#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
- return -EPERM;
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
+ oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
- sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
- if (context && context->in_syscall) {
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* are we setting or clearing? */
+ if (uid_valid(loginuid))
+ sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
- if (ab) {
- audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
- "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
- " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
- task->pid,
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(task)),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task->loginuid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid),
- task->sessionid, sessionid);
- audit_log_end(ab);
- }
- }
task->sessionid = sessionid;
task->loginuid = loginuid;
- return 0;
+out:
+ audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
+ return rc;
}
/**
context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
}
-int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ax)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- ax->argc = bprm->argc;
- ax->envc = bprm->envc;
- ax->mm = bprm->mm;
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
- ax->d.next = context->aux;
- context->aux = (void *)ax;
- return 0;
+ context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
+ context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
}
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- context->target_pid = t->pid;
+ context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t);
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
- audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
+ audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
else
/* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
* in audit_context */
if (!ctx->target_pid) {
- ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
+ ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
}
BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
- axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
+ axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
- struct dentry *dentry;
ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ax)
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
- dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
- get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
- dput(dentry);
+ get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
/**
* __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
- * @pid: target pid of the capset call
* @new: the new credentials
* @old: the old (current) credentials
*
- * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
+ * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
* audit system if applicable
*/
-void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
- const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- context->capset.pid = pid;
+ context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current);
context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
kuid_t auid, uid;
kgid_t gid;
unsigned int sessionid;
+ char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
sessionid);
audit_log_task_context(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
+ audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
}
-static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
-{
- audit_log_task(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
- audit_log_string(ab, reason);
- audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
-}
/**
* audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
* @signr: signal value
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
- audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
+ audit_log_task(ab);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
if (unlikely(!ab))
return;
audit_log_task(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
- audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
- audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
- audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
- audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
+ signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, is_compat_task(),
+ KSTK_EIP(current), code);
audit_log_end(ab);
}