2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
74 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
76 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
78 static struct sidtab sidtab;
79 struct policydb policydb;
83 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
84 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
85 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
88 static u32 latest_granting;
90 /* Forward declaration. */
91 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
94 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
95 struct context *tcontext,
97 struct av_decision *avd);
99 struct selinux_mapping {
100 u16 value; /* policy value */
102 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
105 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
106 static u16 current_mapping_size;
108 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
109 struct security_class_mapping *map,
110 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
113 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
114 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
117 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
119 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
126 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
127 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
131 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
133 while (map[j].name) {
134 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
135 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
137 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
138 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
139 p_out->num_perms = 0;
143 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
146 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
148 if (pol->reject_unknown)
150 p_out->num_perms = 0;
151 print_unknown_handle = true;
156 while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
157 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
158 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
162 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
164 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
166 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
167 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
168 if (pol->reject_unknown)
170 print_unknown_handle = true;
175 p_out->num_perms = k;
178 if (print_unknown_handle)
179 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
180 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
182 *out_map_p = out_map;
191 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
194 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
196 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
197 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
203 * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
205 static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
209 for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
210 if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
214 return SECCLASS_NULL;
217 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
220 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
221 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
224 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
225 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
227 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
230 avd->allowed = result;
232 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
233 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
235 avd->auditallow = result;
237 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
238 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
240 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
244 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
245 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
246 * should audit that denial
248 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
250 avd->auditdeny = result;
254 int security_mls_enabled(void)
256 return policydb.mls_enabled;
260 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
261 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
264 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
265 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
266 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
267 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
268 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
270 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
271 struct context *tcontext,
272 struct context *xcontext,
273 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
277 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
278 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
279 struct constraint_expr *e;
280 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
283 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
284 switch (e->expr_type) {
300 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
304 val1 = scontext->user;
305 val2 = tcontext->user;
308 val1 = scontext->type;
309 val2 = tcontext->type;
312 val1 = scontext->role;
313 val2 = tcontext->role;
314 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
315 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
318 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
322 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
326 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
328 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
336 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
337 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
340 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
341 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
344 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
345 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
348 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
349 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
352 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
353 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
356 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
357 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
362 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
365 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
368 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
371 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
374 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
388 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
391 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
399 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
402 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
404 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
411 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
413 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
415 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
424 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
427 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
445 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
446 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
448 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
450 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
451 char **permission_names = args;
453 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
455 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
460 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
461 struct context *tcontext,
466 struct common_datum *common_dat;
467 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
468 struct audit_buffer *ab;
470 char *scontext_name = NULL;
471 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
472 char *permission_names[32];
475 bool need_comma = false;
480 tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
481 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
482 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
484 /* init permission_names */
486 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
487 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
490 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
491 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
494 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
495 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
496 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
499 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
500 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
503 /* audit a message */
504 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
505 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
509 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
510 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
511 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
513 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
514 u32 mask = (1 << index);
516 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
519 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
520 need_comma ? "," : "",
521 permission_names[index]
522 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
527 /* release scontext/tcontext */
528 kfree(tcontext_name);
529 kfree(scontext_name);
535 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
536 * on boundary constraint.
538 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
539 struct context *tcontext,
541 struct av_decision *avd)
543 struct context lo_scontext;
544 struct context lo_tcontext;
545 struct av_decision lo_avd;
546 struct type_datum *source;
547 struct type_datum *target;
550 source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
554 target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
558 if (source->bounds) {
559 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
561 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
562 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
564 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
568 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
569 return; /* no masked permission */
570 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
573 if (target->bounds) {
574 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
576 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
577 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
579 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
583 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
584 return; /* no masked permission */
585 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
588 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
589 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
591 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
595 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
599 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
600 return; /* no masked permission */
601 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
605 /* mask violated permissions */
606 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
608 /* audit masked permissions */
609 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
610 tclass, masked, "bounds");
615 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
616 * the permissions in a particular class.
618 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
619 struct context *tcontext,
621 struct av_decision *avd)
623 struct constraint_node *constraint;
624 struct role_allow *ra;
625 struct avtab_key avkey;
626 struct avtab_node *node;
627 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
628 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
629 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
634 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
636 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
637 if (printk_ratelimit())
638 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
642 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
645 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
646 * this permission check, then use it.
648 avkey.target_class = tclass;
649 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
650 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
652 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
654 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
655 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
656 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
657 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
658 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
660 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
661 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
662 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
663 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
664 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
665 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
666 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
669 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
670 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
676 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
679 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
681 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
682 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
684 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
686 constraint = constraint->next;
690 * If checking process transition permission and the
691 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
694 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
695 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
696 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
697 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
698 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
699 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
703 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
707 * If the given source and target types have boundary
708 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
709 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
711 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
715 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
716 struct context *ncontext,
717 struct context *tcontext,
720 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
721 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
723 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
725 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
727 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
729 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
730 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
731 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
732 o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
738 if (!selinux_enforcing)
743 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
746 struct context *ocontext;
747 struct context *ncontext;
748 struct context *tcontext;
749 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
750 struct constraint_node *constraint;
757 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
759 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
761 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
762 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
767 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
769 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
771 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
777 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
779 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
785 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
787 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
793 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
795 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
797 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
801 constraint = constraint->next;
805 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
810 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
811 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
812 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
813 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
815 * @oldsid : current security identifier
816 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
818 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
820 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
821 struct type_datum *type;
825 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
828 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
830 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
836 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
838 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
844 /* type/domain unchanged */
845 if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
848 index = new_context->type;
850 type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
854 /* not bounded anymore */
859 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
861 if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
864 index = type->bounds;
868 char *old_name = NULL;
869 char *new_name = NULL;
872 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
873 &old_name, &length) &&
874 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
875 &new_name, &length)) {
876 audit_log(current->audit_context,
877 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
878 "op=security_bounded_transition "
880 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
887 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
892 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
896 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
897 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
903 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
904 * @ssid: source security identifier
905 * @tsid: target security identifier
906 * @tclass: target security class
907 * @avd: access vector decisions
909 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
910 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
912 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
915 struct av_decision *avd)
918 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
920 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
925 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
927 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
932 /* permissive domain? */
933 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
934 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
936 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
938 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
943 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
944 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
945 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
949 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
950 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
952 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
955 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
959 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
962 struct av_decision *avd)
964 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
966 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
971 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
973 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
978 /* permissive domain? */
979 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
980 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
982 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
984 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
989 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
990 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
995 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
997 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1000 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1005 * Write the security context string representation of
1006 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1007 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
1008 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1009 * the length of the string.
1011 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1020 *scontext_len = context->len;
1022 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1029 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1030 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
1031 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
1032 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
1033 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1038 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1039 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1042 *scontext = scontextp;
1045 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1047 sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1048 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
1049 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
1050 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1051 scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) +
1052 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) +
1053 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1055 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1062 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1064 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1066 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1068 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1071 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1072 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1074 struct context *context;
1081 if (!ss_initialized) {
1082 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1085 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1088 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1093 strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
1094 *scontext = scontextp;
1097 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1098 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1102 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1104 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1106 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1108 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1113 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1115 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1122 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1123 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1124 * @scontext: security context
1125 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1127 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1128 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1129 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1131 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1133 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1136 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1138 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1142 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1144 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1145 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1148 struct context *ctx,
1151 struct role_datum *role;
1152 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1153 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1154 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1159 /* Parse the security context. */
1162 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1164 /* Extract the user. */
1166 while (*p && *p != ':')
1174 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1178 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1182 while (*p && *p != ':')
1190 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1193 ctx->role = role->value;
1197 while (*p && *p != ':')
1202 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1203 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1206 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1208 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1213 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
1216 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1217 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
1222 context_destroy(ctx);
1226 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1227 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1230 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1231 struct context context;
1234 /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1238 if (!ss_initialized) {
1241 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1242 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1247 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1252 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1253 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
1256 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1257 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1260 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1262 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1267 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1268 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
1269 scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
1270 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1272 context.len = scontext_len;
1276 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1277 context_destroy(&context);
1279 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1287 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1288 * @scontext: security context
1289 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1290 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1292 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1293 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1294 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1295 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1297 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid)
1299 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1300 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0);
1304 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1305 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1307 * @scontext: security context
1308 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1309 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1310 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1312 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1313 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1314 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1315 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1316 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1317 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1318 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1319 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1321 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1322 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1324 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1325 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1328 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1331 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1332 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1335 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1336 struct context *scontext,
1337 struct context *tcontext,
1339 struct context *newcontext)
1341 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1342 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1344 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
1346 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
1348 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
1350 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1351 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
1355 n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
1360 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1365 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
1366 u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
1367 const char *objname)
1369 struct filename_trans ft;
1370 struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
1373 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1374 * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1375 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1377 if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
1385 otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
1387 newcontext->type = otype->otype;
1390 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1394 const char *objname,
1398 struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
1399 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1400 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1401 struct avtab_key avkey;
1402 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1403 struct avtab_node *node;
1408 if (!ss_initialized) {
1409 switch (orig_tclass) {
1410 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1420 context_init(&newcontext);
1422 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1425 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1426 sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
1428 tclass = orig_tclass;
1429 sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
1432 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1434 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1439 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1441 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1447 if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
1448 cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
1450 /* Set the user identity. */
1451 switch (specified) {
1452 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1454 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1455 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1457 /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1458 /* Use the process user identity. */
1459 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1463 /* Use the related object owner. */
1464 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1468 /* Set the role to default values. */
1469 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1470 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1471 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1472 newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
1474 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
1475 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1477 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1480 /* Set the type to default values. */
1481 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1482 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1483 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1484 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1486 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
1487 /* Use the type of process. */
1488 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1490 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1491 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1495 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1496 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1497 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1498 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1499 avkey.specified = specified;
1500 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1502 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1504 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1505 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1506 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1507 avdatum = &node->datum;
1514 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1515 newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
1518 /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1520 filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
1521 tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
1523 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1524 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1525 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1526 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
1527 if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
1528 (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
1529 (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
1530 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1531 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1537 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1538 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1539 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
1544 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1545 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1546 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1553 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1554 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1556 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1557 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1563 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1564 * @ssid: source security identifier
1565 * @tsid: target security identifier
1566 * @tclass: target security class
1567 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1569 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1570 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1571 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1572 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1573 * computed successfully.
1575 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1576 const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
1578 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1579 qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
1582 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1583 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
1585 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1586 objname, out_sid, false);
1590 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1591 * @ssid: source security identifier
1592 * @tsid: target security identifier
1593 * @tclass: target security class
1594 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1596 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1597 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1598 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1599 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1600 * computed successfully.
1602 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1607 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
1612 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1613 * @ssid: source security identifier
1614 * @tsid: target security identifier
1615 * @tclass: target security class
1616 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1618 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1619 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1620 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1621 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1622 * computed successfully.
1624 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1629 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
1633 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1634 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1635 struct context *context,
1638 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1640 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1641 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1646 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1651 if (selinux_enforcing)
1654 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1655 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
1661 struct convert_context_args {
1662 struct policydb *oldp;
1663 struct policydb *newp;
1667 * Convert the values in the security context
1668 * structure `c' from the values specified
1669 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1670 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1671 * context is valid under the new policy.
1673 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1677 struct convert_context_args *args;
1678 struct context oldc;
1679 struct ocontext *oc;
1680 struct mls_range *range;
1681 struct role_datum *role;
1682 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1683 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1688 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1697 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1701 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1702 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1705 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1707 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1709 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1711 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1712 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1716 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1717 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1723 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1727 /* Convert the user. */
1729 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1730 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
1733 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1735 /* Convert the role. */
1737 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1738 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
1741 c->role = role->value;
1743 /* Convert the type. */
1745 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1746 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
1749 c->type = typdatum->value;
1751 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1752 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1753 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1756 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1758 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1759 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1760 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1762 mls_context_destroy(c);
1763 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1765 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1766 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1767 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1768 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1771 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1772 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1776 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1777 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1780 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1781 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1786 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1787 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1788 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1793 context_destroy(&oldc);
1799 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1800 rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
1803 context_destroy(&oldc);
1807 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1813 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1815 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1816 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1817 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1818 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1821 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
1824 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1825 * @data: binary policy data
1826 * @len: length of data in bytes
1828 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1829 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1830 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1831 * loading the new policy.
1833 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
1835 struct policydb oldpolicydb, newpolicydb;
1836 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
1837 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
1838 struct convert_context_args args;
1842 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
1844 if (!ss_initialized) {
1846 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
1848 avtab_cache_destroy();
1853 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
1855 ¤t_mapping_size);
1857 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1858 avtab_cache_destroy();
1862 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
1864 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1865 avtab_cache_destroy();
1869 security_load_policycaps();
1871 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1872 selinux_complete_init();
1873 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1874 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1875 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
1876 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1877 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1882 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
1885 rc = policydb_read(&newpolicydb, fp);
1889 newpolicydb.len = len;
1890 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
1891 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1892 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
1893 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb.mls_enabled)
1894 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
1896 rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
1898 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
1899 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1903 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
1907 rc = security_preserve_bools(&newpolicydb);
1909 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
1913 /* Clone the SID table. */
1914 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
1916 rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
1921 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
1922 * in the new SID table.
1924 args.oldp = &policydb;
1925 args.newp = &newpolicydb;
1926 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
1928 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
1929 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
1934 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1935 memcpy(&oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof policydb);
1936 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
1938 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1939 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1940 memcpy(&policydb, &newpolicydb, sizeof policydb);
1941 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
1942 security_load_policycaps();
1943 oldmap = current_mapping;
1944 current_mapping = map;
1945 current_mapping_size = map_size;
1946 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1947 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1949 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1950 policydb_destroy(&oldpolicydb);
1951 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
1954 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1955 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1956 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
1957 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1958 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1964 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
1965 policydb_destroy(&newpolicydb);
1970 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
1974 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1976 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1982 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1983 * @protocol: protocol number
1984 * @port: port number
1985 * @out_sid: security identifier
1987 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
1992 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1994 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
1996 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
1997 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
1998 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
2005 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2011 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2013 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
2017 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2022 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2023 * @name: interface name
2024 * @if_sid: interface SID
2026 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
2031 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2033 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
2035 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
2041 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
2042 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2047 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2053 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
2055 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
2058 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2062 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
2066 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
2067 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2076 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2077 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2079 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2080 * @out_sid: security identifier
2082 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
2090 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2097 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
2100 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2102 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2104 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2113 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
2115 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2117 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2126 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2132 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2138 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2140 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2145 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2152 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2153 * @fromsid: starting SID
2154 * @username: username
2155 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2156 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2158 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2159 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2160 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2161 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2162 * number of elements in the array.
2165 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2170 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2171 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2172 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2173 struct user_datum *user;
2174 struct role_datum *role;
2175 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2181 if (!ss_initialized)
2184 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2186 context_init(&usercon);
2189 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2194 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2198 usercon.user = user->value;
2201 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2205 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2206 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2207 usercon.role = i + 1;
2208 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2209 usercon.type = j + 1;
2211 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2214 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2217 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2218 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2222 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2225 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2228 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2234 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2241 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2246 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2247 struct av_decision dummy_avd;
2248 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2249 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2250 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2253 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2265 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2266 * @fstype: filesystem type
2267 * @path: path from root of mount
2268 * @sclass: file security class
2269 * @sid: SID for path
2271 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2272 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2273 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2275 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2282 struct genfs *genfs;
2286 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2289 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2291 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2292 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2294 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2295 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2304 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2305 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2306 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2307 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2316 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
2324 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2329 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2330 * @fstype: filesystem type
2331 * @behavior: labeling behavior
2332 * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
2334 int security_fs_use(
2336 unsigned int *behavior,
2342 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2344 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2346 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2352 *behavior = c->v.behavior;
2354 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
2361 rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
2363 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2366 *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2371 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2375 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2379 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2384 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2389 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2394 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2398 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2401 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2402 name_len = strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i)) + 1;
2405 (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
2409 strncpy((*names)[i], sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), name_len);
2410 (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
2414 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2418 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2426 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2429 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2430 struct cond_node *cur;
2432 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2435 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2439 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2440 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2441 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2442 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2443 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2444 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2446 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2447 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2448 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2451 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2453 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2456 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2457 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2462 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2465 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2467 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2468 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2469 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2470 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2475 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2480 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2483 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2487 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
2489 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2493 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2495 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2496 char **bnames = NULL;
2497 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2498 struct cond_node *cur;
2500 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2503 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2504 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2506 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2508 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2509 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2516 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2525 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2526 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2528 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2530 struct context *context1;
2531 struct context *context2;
2532 struct context newcon;
2538 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2543 context_init(&newcon);
2545 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2548 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2550 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2556 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2558 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2563 newcon.user = context1->user;
2564 newcon.role = context1->role;
2565 newcon.type = context1->type;
2566 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2570 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2571 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2572 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2574 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2575 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2576 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
2583 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2585 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2586 context_destroy(&newcon);
2592 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2593 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2594 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2595 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2598 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2599 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2600 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2601 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2603 * | function return | @sid
2604 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2605 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2606 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2607 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2608 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2611 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2616 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2617 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2619 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2621 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2622 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2623 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2624 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2625 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2628 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2629 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2631 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2632 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2636 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2637 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2638 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2639 if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
2642 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2645 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2647 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2648 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2652 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2654 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2655 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2658 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2662 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2663 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2664 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2665 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2667 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2669 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2673 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2675 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2676 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2677 int value = datum->value - 1;
2679 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2680 if (!classes[value])
2686 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2690 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2693 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2694 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2698 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2702 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2703 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2708 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2712 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2714 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2715 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2716 int value = datum->value - 1;
2718 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2725 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2728 struct class_datum *match;
2730 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2733 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2735 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2741 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2742 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2746 if (match->comdatum) {
2747 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2748 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2753 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2759 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2763 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2764 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2770 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2772 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2775 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2777 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2781 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2782 * @req_cap: capability
2785 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2786 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2787 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2790 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
2794 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2795 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
2796 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2801 struct selinux_audit_rule {
2803 struct context au_ctxt;
2806 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
2808 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2811 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
2816 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
2818 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
2819 struct role_datum *roledatum;
2820 struct type_datum *typedatum;
2821 struct user_datum *userdatum;
2822 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
2827 if (!ss_initialized)
2831 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2832 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2833 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2834 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2835 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2836 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2837 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
2838 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
2841 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2842 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2843 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2844 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2845 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
2846 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
2850 /* only the above fields are valid */
2854 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
2858 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
2860 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2862 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
2865 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2866 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2868 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
2871 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
2873 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2874 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2876 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
2879 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
2881 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2882 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2884 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
2887 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
2889 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2890 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2891 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2892 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2893 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
2900 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2903 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
2912 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
2913 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
2917 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
2918 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
2920 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2921 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2922 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2923 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2924 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2925 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2926 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2927 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2928 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2929 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2937 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
2938 struct audit_context *actx)
2940 struct context *ctxt;
2941 struct mls_level *level;
2942 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2946 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2947 "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2951 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2953 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
2954 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2955 "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
2960 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2962 audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2963 "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2969 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2972 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2973 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2976 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
2978 case Audit_not_equal:
2979 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
2983 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2984 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2987 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
2989 case Audit_not_equal:
2990 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
2994 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2995 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2998 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
3000 case Audit_not_equal:
3001 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
3005 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3006 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3007 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3008 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3009 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
3010 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
3011 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
3014 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3017 case Audit_not_equal:
3018 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3022 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3024 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3028 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3032 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
3033 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
3034 !mls_level_eq(level,
3035 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
3038 match = mls_level_dom(level,
3039 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
3045 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3049 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
3051 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
3055 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
3056 err = aurule_callback();
3060 static int __init aurule_init(void)
3064 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
3066 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3070 __initcall(aurule_init);
3072 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3074 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3075 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3076 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3079 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3080 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3081 * already been initialized.
3084 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3089 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3090 if (sid_cache == NULL)
3092 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3093 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3099 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3100 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3101 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3105 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3106 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3107 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3110 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3111 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3112 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
3113 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3114 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3115 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3119 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3123 struct context *ctx;
3124 struct context ctx_new;
3126 if (!ss_initialized) {
3131 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3133 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
3134 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3135 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
3136 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3137 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3139 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3143 context_init(&ctx_new);
3144 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3145 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3146 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3147 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3148 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3149 rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3150 secattr->attr.mls.cat);
3153 memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
3154 &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3155 sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
3158 if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
3161 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3165 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3167 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3171 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3174 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3176 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3181 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3182 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3183 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3186 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3187 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3190 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3193 struct context *ctx;
3195 if (!ss_initialized)
3198 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3201 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3206 secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
3208 if (secattr->domain == NULL)
3211 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3212 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3213 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3214 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3216 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3219 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3222 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3223 * @data: binary policy data
3224 * @len: length of data in bytes
3227 int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
3230 struct policy_file fp;
3232 if (!ss_initialized)
3235 *len = security_policydb_len();
3237 *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3244 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3245 rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
3246 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3251 *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;