2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
159 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
161 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
163 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
165 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
170 task->security = tsec;
175 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
177 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
178 task->security = NULL;
182 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
184 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
187 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
191 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
192 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
194 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
195 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
196 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
197 inode->i_security = isec;
202 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
204 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
205 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
207 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
208 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
209 list_del_init(&isec->list);
210 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
212 inode->i_security = NULL;
213 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
216 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
218 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
219 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
221 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
225 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
226 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
227 file->f_security = fsec;
232 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
235 file->f_security = NULL;
239 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
241 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
243 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
247 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
249 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
250 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
252 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
253 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
254 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
255 sb->s_security = sbsec;
260 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
262 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
264 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
265 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
266 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
267 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
269 sb->s_security = NULL;
273 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
275 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
277 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
295 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
299 /* The security server must be initialized before
300 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
301 extern int ss_initialized;
303 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
305 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
307 "uses transition SIDs",
309 "uses genfs_contexts",
310 "not configured for labeling",
311 "uses mountpoint labeling",
314 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
316 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
318 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
329 static const match_table_t tokens = {
330 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
332 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
333 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
337 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
339 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
355 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
357 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
360 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
361 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
365 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
366 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
370 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
372 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
373 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
374 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
377 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
378 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
379 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
380 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
381 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
382 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
383 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
384 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
385 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
389 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
390 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
391 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
392 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
393 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
396 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
397 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
398 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
403 sbsec->initialized = 1;
405 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
406 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
407 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
409 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
410 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
411 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
413 /* Initialize the root inode. */
414 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
416 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
417 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
418 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
420 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
422 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
423 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
424 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
425 struct inode_security_struct, list);
426 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
427 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
428 inode = igrab(inode);
430 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
434 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
435 list_del_init(&isec->list);
438 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
444 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
445 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
446 * mount options, or whatever.
448 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
449 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
452 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
453 char *context = NULL;
457 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
459 if (!sbsec->initialized)
466 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
467 * settings this is going to need a mask
470 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
471 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
473 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
477 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
483 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
484 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
490 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
491 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
494 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
495 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
497 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
498 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
501 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
502 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
504 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
505 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
508 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
509 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
511 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
512 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
513 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
515 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
518 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
519 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
522 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
527 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
531 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
532 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->initialized)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!sbsec->initialized)
544 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
557 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
575 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
576 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
577 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
578 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
582 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
583 "before the security server is initialized\n");
588 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
589 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
590 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
591 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
593 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
594 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
595 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
596 * will be used for both mounts)
598 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
603 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
604 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
605 * than once with different security options.
607 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
609 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
610 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
612 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
613 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
614 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
621 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
623 goto out_double_mount;
625 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
630 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
632 goto out_double_mount;
634 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
636 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
637 rootcontext_sid = sid;
639 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
641 goto out_double_mount;
643 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
647 defcontext_sid = sid;
649 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
651 goto out_double_mount;
653 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
662 if (sbsec->initialized) {
663 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
664 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
665 goto out_double_mount;
670 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
673 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
674 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
676 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
677 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
681 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
684 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
688 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
692 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
693 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
694 * the superblock context if not already set.
697 if (!fscontext_sid) {
698 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
701 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
703 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
719 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
720 root_isec->initialized = 1;
723 if (defcontext_sid) {
724 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
726 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
727 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
731 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
732 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
738 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
741 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
743 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
747 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
748 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
752 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
753 struct super_block *newsb)
755 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
756 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
758 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
763 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
764 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
767 if (!ss_initialized) {
768 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
769 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
770 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
771 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
775 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
776 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
778 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
779 if (newsbsec->initialized)
782 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
784 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
786 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
787 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
788 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
791 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
795 if (!set_rootcontext) {
796 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
797 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
800 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
802 if (set_rootcontext) {
803 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
804 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
805 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
806 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
808 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
811 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
812 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
815 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
816 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
819 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
820 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
821 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
823 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
825 /* Standard string-based options. */
826 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
828 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
833 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
837 if (context || defcontext) {
839 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
842 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
852 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
855 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
862 case Opt_rootcontext:
865 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
868 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
876 if (context || defcontext) {
878 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
881 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
890 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
897 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
901 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
902 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
903 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
921 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
924 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
935 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
937 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
940 char *options = data;
941 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
943 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
948 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
950 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
955 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
958 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
962 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
963 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
968 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
969 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
971 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
973 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
976 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
978 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
982 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 /* we need a comma before each option */
992 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
998 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1000 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1003 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1005 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1011 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1013 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1018 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1020 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1022 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1024 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1026 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1032 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1038 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1041 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1043 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1046 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1048 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1051 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1057 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1058 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1060 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1067 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1068 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1070 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1072 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1073 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1079 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1086 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1087 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1088 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1118 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1119 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1124 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1126 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1131 end = buffer+buflen;
1136 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1137 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1141 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1146 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1147 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1151 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1159 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1160 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1162 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1163 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1165 struct dentry *dentry;
1166 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1167 char *context = NULL;
1171 if (isec->initialized)
1174 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1175 if (isec->initialized)
1178 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1179 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1180 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1181 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1182 server is ready to handle calls. */
1183 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1184 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1185 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1186 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1190 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1191 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1192 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1193 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1197 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1198 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1200 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1201 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1203 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1204 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1207 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1208 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1213 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1214 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1220 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1222 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1223 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1224 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1232 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1238 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1244 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1245 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1246 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1247 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1251 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1252 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1255 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1259 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1260 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1261 __func__, context, -rc,
1262 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1264 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1272 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1273 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1275 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1276 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1277 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1279 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1280 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1281 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1289 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1290 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1293 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1294 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1296 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1297 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1299 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1300 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1311 isec->initialized = 1;
1314 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1316 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1317 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1321 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1322 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1328 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1329 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1332 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1333 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1336 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1337 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1340 /* All other signals. */
1341 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1348 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1349 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1350 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1351 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1354 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1356 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1357 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1358 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1359 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1362 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1363 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1366 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1367 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1370 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1371 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1373 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1375 tsec = tsk->security;
1377 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1381 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1383 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1386 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1390 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1393 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1396 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1397 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1400 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1402 tsec = tsk->security;
1404 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1405 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1408 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1409 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1410 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1411 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1412 struct inode *inode,
1414 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1416 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1417 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1418 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1420 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1423 tsec = tsk->security;
1424 isec = inode->i_security;
1428 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1429 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1432 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1435 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1436 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1437 pathname if needed. */
1438 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1439 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1440 struct dentry *dentry,
1443 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1444 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1445 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1446 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1447 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1448 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1451 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1452 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1453 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1454 check a particular permission to the file.
1455 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1456 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1457 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1458 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1459 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1463 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1464 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1465 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1466 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1469 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1470 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1472 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1473 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1481 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1483 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1488 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1489 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1490 struct dentry *dentry,
1493 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1494 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1495 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1497 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1500 tsec = current->security;
1501 dsec = dir->i_security;
1502 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1504 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1505 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1507 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1508 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1513 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1514 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1516 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1522 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1526 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1527 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1528 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1531 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1532 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1533 struct task_struct *ctx)
1535 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1537 tsec = ctx->security;
1539 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1543 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1546 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1547 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1548 struct dentry *dentry,
1552 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1553 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1554 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1558 tsec = current->security;
1559 dsec = dir->i_security;
1560 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1562 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1563 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1566 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1567 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1582 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1587 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1591 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1592 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1593 struct inode *new_dir,
1594 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1596 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1597 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1600 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1603 tsec = current->security;
1604 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1605 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1606 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1607 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1609 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1611 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1612 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1613 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1616 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1617 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1620 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1621 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1622 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1627 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1628 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1629 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1630 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1631 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1634 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1635 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1636 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1637 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1639 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1647 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1648 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1649 struct super_block *sb,
1651 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1653 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1654 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1656 tsec = tsk->security;
1657 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1658 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1662 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1663 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1667 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1668 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1669 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1670 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1673 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1675 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1679 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1681 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1683 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1690 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1691 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1695 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1697 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1698 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1705 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1714 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1717 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1719 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1721 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1722 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1724 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1728 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1729 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1730 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1731 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1732 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1733 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1734 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1737 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1738 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1743 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1745 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1750 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1754 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1755 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1756 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1757 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1758 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1761 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1764 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1768 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1772 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1775 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1776 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1780 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1784 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1787 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1788 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1792 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1796 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1799 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1800 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1802 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1805 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1809 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1813 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1816 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1819 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1822 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1827 end = buffer+buflen;
1833 const char *name = table->procname;
1834 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1835 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1839 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1842 table = table->parent;
1848 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1850 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1852 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1857 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1861 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1865 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1869 tsec = current->security;
1871 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1872 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1874 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1875 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1878 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1879 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1881 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1882 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1890 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1891 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1897 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1910 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1916 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1920 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1926 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1928 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1931 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1935 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1940 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1941 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1942 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1944 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1945 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1946 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1947 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1949 case 0: /* Close log */
1950 case 1: /* Open log */
1951 case 2: /* Read from log */
1952 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1953 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1955 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1962 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1963 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1964 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1966 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1967 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1968 * the capability is granted.
1970 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1971 * processes that allocate mappings.
1973 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1975 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1976 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1978 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1980 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1981 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1982 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1989 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1992 /* binprm security operations */
1994 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1996 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1998 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
2002 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2005 bprm->security = bsec;
2009 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2011 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2012 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2013 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2014 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2016 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2019 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2023 bsec = bprm->security;
2028 tsec = current->security;
2029 isec = inode->i_security;
2031 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2032 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2034 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2035 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2036 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2037 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2039 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2040 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2041 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2044 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2045 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2046 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2051 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2052 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2054 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2057 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2058 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2059 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2063 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2064 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2065 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2069 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2070 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2074 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2075 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2077 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2085 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2087 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2091 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2093 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2096 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2097 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2098 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2099 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2100 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2102 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2105 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2108 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2110 kfree(bprm->security);
2111 bprm->security = NULL;
2114 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2115 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2117 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2118 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2120 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2121 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2122 struct tty_struct *tty;
2123 struct fdtable *fdt;
2127 tty = get_current_tty();
2130 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2131 struct inode *inode;
2133 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2134 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2135 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2136 file may belong to another process and we are only
2137 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2138 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2139 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2140 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2141 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2148 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2152 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2154 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2156 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2158 unsigned long set, i;
2163 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2164 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2166 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2169 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2170 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2175 if (file_has_perm(current,
2177 file_to_av(file))) {
2179 fd = get_unused_fd();
2189 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2190 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2197 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2202 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2205 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2208 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2210 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2211 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2215 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2217 tsec = current->security;
2219 bsec = bprm->security;
2222 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2224 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2225 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2226 unchanged and kill. */
2227 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2228 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2229 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2236 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2237 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2238 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2239 struct task_struct *tracer;
2240 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2244 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2245 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2246 sec = tracer->security;
2252 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2253 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2265 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2267 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2269 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2270 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2271 struct itimerval itimer;
2272 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2273 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2275 unsigned long flags;
2277 tsec = current->security;
2278 bsec = bprm->security;
2281 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2284 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2287 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2288 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2290 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2291 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2292 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2293 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2294 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2295 will be checked against the new SID. */
2296 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2297 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2299 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2300 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2301 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2302 flush_signals(current);
2303 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2304 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2305 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2306 recalc_sigpending();
2307 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2310 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2311 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2313 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2314 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2315 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2316 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2317 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2318 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2319 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2320 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2321 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2323 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2324 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2326 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2327 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2328 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2329 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2331 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2334 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2335 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2336 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2337 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2338 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2339 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2340 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2341 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2344 /* superblock security operations */
2346 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2348 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2351 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2353 superblock_free_security(sb);
2356 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2361 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2364 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2366 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2367 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2368 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2369 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2372 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2379 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2383 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2386 int current_size = 0;
2394 while (current_size < len) {
2404 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2406 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2407 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2408 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2414 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2422 in_save = in_end = orig;
2426 open_quote = !open_quote;
2427 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2429 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2431 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2432 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2434 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2436 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2438 } while (*in_end++);
2440 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2441 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2446 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2448 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2451 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2455 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2456 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2457 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2460 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2462 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2464 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2465 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2466 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2469 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2472 unsigned long flags,
2477 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2481 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2482 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2483 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2485 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2489 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2493 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2497 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2498 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2501 /* inode security operations */
2503 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2505 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2508 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2510 inode_free_security(inode);
2513 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2514 char **name, void **value,
2517 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2518 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2519 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2522 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2524 tsec = current->security;
2525 dsec = dir->i_security;
2526 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2528 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2529 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2531 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2532 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2535 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2536 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2539 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2544 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2545 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2546 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2547 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2549 isec->initialized = 1;
2552 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2556 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2563 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2575 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2577 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2580 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2584 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2587 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2590 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2594 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2597 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2600 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2602 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2605 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2607 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2610 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2612 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2615 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2619 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2623 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2626 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2627 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2629 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2632 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2634 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2637 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2641 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2644 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2647 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2651 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2656 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2660 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2661 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2664 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2668 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2672 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2675 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2676 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2677 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2679 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2682 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2684 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2687 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2689 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2690 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2691 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2692 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2694 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2695 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2696 Restrict to administrator. */
2701 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2702 ordinary setattr permission. */
2703 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2706 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2707 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2709 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2710 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2711 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2712 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2713 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2717 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2718 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2720 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2721 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2724 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2727 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2728 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2730 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2731 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2735 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2736 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2737 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2739 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2744 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2745 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2749 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2754 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2756 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2757 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2761 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2762 const void *value, size_t size,
2765 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2766 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2770 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2771 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2775 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2777 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2778 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2779 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2787 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2789 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2792 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2794 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2797 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2799 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2800 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2802 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2803 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2808 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2810 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2812 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2816 char *context = NULL;
2817 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2818 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2820 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2824 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2825 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2826 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2827 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2828 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2829 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2830 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2832 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2834 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2835 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2836 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2840 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2843 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2856 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2857 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2859 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2863 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2866 if (!value || !size)
2869 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2877 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2879 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2880 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2881 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2885 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2887 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2890 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2892 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2895 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2897 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2901 /* file security operations */
2903 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2906 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2909 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2913 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2914 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2917 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2918 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2922 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2925 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2927 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2928 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2929 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2930 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2933 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2937 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2938 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2939 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2941 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2944 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2946 return file_alloc_security(file);
2949 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2951 file_free_security(file);
2954 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2959 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2961 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2966 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2969 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2971 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2972 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2974 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2975 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2976 * This has an additional check.
2978 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2985 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2986 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2988 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2989 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2992 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2993 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2995 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
3000 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3001 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3002 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3005 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
3007 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3008 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3009 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3010 if (rc || addr_only)
3013 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3016 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3017 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3020 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3021 unsigned long reqprot,
3026 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3030 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3033 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3034 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3036 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3037 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3038 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3040 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3041 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3042 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3043 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3044 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3046 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3047 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3048 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3049 * modified content. This typically should only
3050 * occur for text relocations.
3052 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3060 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3063 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3065 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3068 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3075 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3080 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3081 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3090 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3091 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3096 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3101 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3105 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3112 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3114 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3115 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3117 tsec = current->security;
3118 fsec = file->f_security;
3119 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3124 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3125 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3129 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3130 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3132 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3133 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3135 tsec = tsk->security;
3136 fsec = file->f_security;
3139 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3141 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3143 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3144 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3147 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3149 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3152 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3154 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3155 struct inode *inode;
3156 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3157 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3158 fsec = file->f_security;
3159 isec = inode->i_security;
3161 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3162 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3163 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3164 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3165 * struct as its SID.
3167 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3168 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3170 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3171 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3172 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3173 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3174 * new inode label or new policy.
3175 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3177 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3180 /* task security operations */
3182 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3186 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3190 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3193 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3195 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3198 tsec1 = current->security;
3200 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3203 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3205 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3206 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3208 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3209 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3210 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3211 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3212 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3217 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3219 task_free_security(tsk);
3222 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3224 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3225 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3226 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3227 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3228 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3233 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3235 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3238 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3240 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3244 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3246 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3249 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3251 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3254 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3256 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3259 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3261 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3265 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3267 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3271 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3275 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3279 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3282 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3286 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3290 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3293 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3295 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3298 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3300 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3303 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3307 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3308 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3309 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3310 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3311 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3312 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3317 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3321 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3325 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3328 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3330 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3333 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3335 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3338 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3343 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3345 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3350 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3352 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3355 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3357 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3361 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3368 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3369 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3370 the state of the current process. */
3371 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3374 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3376 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3379 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3381 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3383 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3386 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3387 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3391 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3392 struct inode *inode)
3394 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3395 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3397 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3398 isec->initialized = 1;
3402 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3403 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3404 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3406 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3407 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3409 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3410 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3414 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3415 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3418 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3419 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3423 *proto = ih->protocol;
3425 switch (ih->protocol) {
3427 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3429 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3433 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3437 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3438 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3443 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3445 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3449 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3453 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3454 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3458 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3459 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3461 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3465 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3469 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3470 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3481 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3483 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3484 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3485 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3488 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3489 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3491 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3492 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3496 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3497 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3500 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3501 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3502 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3511 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3513 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3517 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3518 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3523 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3525 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3529 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3530 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3534 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3535 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3537 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3541 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3542 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3546 /* includes fragments */
3556 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3557 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3562 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3564 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3567 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3568 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3571 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3573 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3576 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3577 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3587 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3588 " unable to parse packet\n");
3598 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3600 * @family: protocol family
3601 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3604 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3605 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3606 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3607 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3608 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3612 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3619 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3620 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3622 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3623 if (unlikely(err)) {
3625 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3626 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3633 /* socket security operations */
3634 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3637 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3638 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3639 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3642 tsec = task->security;
3643 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3645 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3648 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3649 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3650 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3656 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3657 int protocol, int kern)
3660 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3666 tsec = current->security;
3667 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3668 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3669 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3670 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3676 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3677 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3680 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3681 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3682 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3685 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3687 tsec = current->security;
3688 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3689 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3690 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3691 isec->initialized = 1;
3694 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3695 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3696 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3697 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3703 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3704 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3705 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3707 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3712 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3717 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3718 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3719 * check the first address now.
3721 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3722 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3724 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3725 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3726 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3727 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3728 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3729 unsigned short snum;
3730 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3733 tsec = current->security;
3734 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3736 if (family == PF_INET) {
3737 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3738 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3739 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3741 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3742 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3743 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3749 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3751 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3752 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3756 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3757 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3758 ad.u.net.family = family;
3759 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3761 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3767 switch (isec->sclass) {
3768 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3769 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3772 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3773 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3776 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3777 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3781 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3785 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3789 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3790 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3791 ad.u.net.family = family;
3793 if (family == PF_INET)
3794 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3796 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3798 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3799 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3807 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3809 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3810 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3813 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3818 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3820 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3821 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3822 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3823 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3824 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3825 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3826 unsigned short snum;
3829 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3830 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3831 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3833 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3835 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3836 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3838 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3841 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3845 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3846 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3848 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3849 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3850 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3851 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3856 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3862 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3864 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3867 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3870 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3871 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3873 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3877 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3879 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3880 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3881 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3882 newisec->initialized = 1;
3887 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3892 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3896 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3899 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3900 int size, int flags)
3902 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3905 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3907 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3910 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3912 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3915 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3919 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3923 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3926 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3929 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3932 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3934 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3937 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3938 struct socket *other,
3941 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3942 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3943 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3944 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3947 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3951 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3952 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3954 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3955 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3957 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3959 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3963 /* connecting socket */
3964 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3965 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3967 /* server child socket */
3968 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3969 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3970 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3975 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3976 struct socket *other)
3978 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3979 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3980 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3983 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3984 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3986 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3987 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3989 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3990 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3997 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3999 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4005 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4008 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4009 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4013 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4016 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4017 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4020 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4021 struct sk_buff *skb,
4022 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4027 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4029 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4030 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4032 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4033 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4036 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4037 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4038 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4039 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4041 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4042 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4043 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4044 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4046 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4047 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4048 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4049 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4052 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4053 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4058 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4061 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4065 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4068 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4074 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4075 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4076 if (unlikely(err)) {
4078 "SELinux: failure in"
4079 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4080 " network port label not found\n");
4083 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4086 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4090 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4092 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4093 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4096 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4097 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4098 ad.u.net.family = family;
4099 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4103 if (selinux_compat_net)
4104 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4107 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4112 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4113 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4116 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4117 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4119 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4121 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4124 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4130 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4133 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4134 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4135 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4136 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4141 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4144 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4145 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4148 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4149 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4150 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4151 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4152 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4153 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4155 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4156 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4157 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4160 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4161 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4162 ad.u.net.family = family;
4163 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4167 if (peerlbl_active) {
4170 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4173 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4176 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4179 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4182 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4185 if (secmark_active) {
4186 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4195 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4196 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4201 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4203 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4205 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4207 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4208 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4209 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4210 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4212 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4217 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4222 if (scontext_len > len) {
4227 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4231 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4239 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4241 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4244 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4246 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4249 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4253 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4254 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4256 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4259 *secid = peer_secid;
4260 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4265 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4267 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4270 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4272 sk_free_security(sk);
4275 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4277 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4278 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4280 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4281 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4282 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4287 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4290 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4292 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4294 *secid = sksec->sid;
4298 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4300 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4301 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4303 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4304 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4305 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4306 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4309 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4310 struct request_sock *req)
4312 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4314 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4318 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4319 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4322 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4325 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4326 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4327 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4331 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4335 req->secid = newsid;
4336 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4340 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4341 const struct request_sock *req)
4343 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4345 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4346 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4347 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4348 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4349 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4350 time it will have been created and available. */
4352 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4353 * thread with access to newsksec */
4354 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4357 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4359 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4360 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4362 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4363 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4366 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4368 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4371 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4374 fl->secid = req->secid;
4377 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4381 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4382 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4383 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4385 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4389 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4391 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4393 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4394 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4395 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4396 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4397 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4398 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4408 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4413 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4415 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4421 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4426 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4429 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4430 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4431 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4432 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4435 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4438 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4439 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4440 ad.u.net.family = family;
4441 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4444 if (peerlbl_active) {
4445 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4448 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4454 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4455 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4459 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4460 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4461 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4463 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4469 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4470 struct sk_buff *skb,
4471 const struct net_device *in,
4472 const struct net_device *out,
4473 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4475 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4478 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4479 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4480 struct sk_buff *skb,
4481 const struct net_device *in,
4482 const struct net_device *out,
4483 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4485 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4489 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4494 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4497 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4498 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4499 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4501 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4504 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4505 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4511 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4512 struct sk_buff *skb,
4513 const struct net_device *in,
4514 const struct net_device *out,
4515 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4517 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4520 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4522 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4523 u16 family, char *addrp)
4526 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4528 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4529 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4531 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4532 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4535 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4536 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4537 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4538 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4540 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4541 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4542 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4543 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4545 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4546 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4547 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4548 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4551 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4552 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4557 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4560 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4563 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4566 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4573 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4574 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4575 if (unlikely(err)) {
4577 "SELinux: failure in"
4578 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4579 " network port label not found\n");
4582 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4585 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4589 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4590 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4591 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4597 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4599 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4600 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4601 ad.u.net.family = family;
4602 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4605 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4606 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4607 &ad, family, addrp))
4610 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4611 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4615 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4616 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4622 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4628 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4633 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4634 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4635 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4636 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4637 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4638 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4640 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4641 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4642 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4643 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4644 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4645 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4646 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4649 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4650 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4651 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4654 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4655 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4656 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4657 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4662 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4663 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4665 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4668 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4669 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4671 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4676 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4677 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4680 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4682 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4683 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4684 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4687 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4688 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4689 ad.u.net.family = family;
4690 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4694 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4695 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4698 if (peerlbl_active) {
4702 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4704 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4705 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4708 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4710 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4711 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4718 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4719 struct sk_buff *skb,
4720 const struct net_device *in,
4721 const struct net_device *out,
4722 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4724 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4727 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4728 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4729 struct sk_buff *skb,
4730 const struct net_device *in,
4731 const struct net_device *out,
4732 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4734 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4738 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4740 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4744 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4748 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4749 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4754 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4757 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4759 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4763 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4764 ad.u.cap = capability;
4766 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4767 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4770 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4771 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4774 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4775 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4777 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4781 isec->sclass = sclass;
4782 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4783 perm->security = isec;
4788 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4790 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4791 perm->security = NULL;
4795 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4797 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4799 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4803 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4804 msg->security = msec;
4809 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4811 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4813 msg->security = NULL;
4817 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4820 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4821 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4822 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4824 tsec = current->security;
4825 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4827 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4828 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4830 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4833 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4835 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4838 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4840 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4843 /* message queue security operations */
4844 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4846 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4847 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4848 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4851 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4855 tsec = current->security;
4856 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4858 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4859 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4861 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4864 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4870 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4872 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4875 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4877 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4878 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4879 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4881 tsec = current->security;
4882 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4884 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4885 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4887 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4888 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4891 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4899 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4900 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4903 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4906 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4909 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4915 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4919 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4921 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4922 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4923 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4924 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4927 tsec = current->security;
4928 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4929 msec = msg->security;
4932 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4934 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4936 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4937 * message queue this message will be stored in
4939 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4947 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4948 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4950 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4951 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4954 /* Can this process send the message */
4955 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4956 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4958 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4959 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4960 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4965 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4966 struct task_struct *target,
4967 long type, int mode)
4969 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4970 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4971 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4975 tsec = target->security;
4976 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4977 msec = msg->security;
4979 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4980 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4982 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4983 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4985 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4986 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4990 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4991 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4993 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4994 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4995 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4998 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5002 tsec = current->security;
5003 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5005 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5006 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5008 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5011 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5017 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5019 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5022 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5024 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5025 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5026 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5028 tsec = current->security;
5029 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5031 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5032 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5034 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5035 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5038 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5039 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5047 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5048 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5051 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5054 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5061 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5067 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5071 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5072 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5077 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5081 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5084 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5086 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5089 /* Semaphore security operations */
5090 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5092 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5093 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5094 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5097 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5101 tsec = current->security;
5102 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5104 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5105 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5107 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5110 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5116 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5118 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5121 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5123 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5124 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5125 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5127 tsec = current->security;
5128 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5130 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5131 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5133 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5134 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5137 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5138 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5146 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5147 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5151 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5162 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5165 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5169 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5175 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5179 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5180 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5185 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5189 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5192 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5198 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5200 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5205 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5208 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5210 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5214 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5217 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5220 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5221 char *name, char **value)
5223 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5229 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5236 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5238 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5240 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5241 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5242 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5243 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5244 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5245 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5246 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5247 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5254 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5260 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5261 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5263 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5264 struct task_struct *tracer;
5270 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5271 security attributes. */
5276 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5277 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5278 * above restriction is ever removed.
5280 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5281 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5282 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5283 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5284 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5285 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5286 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5287 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5288 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5289 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5295 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5296 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5297 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5301 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5302 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5303 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5305 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5312 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5313 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5314 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5315 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5316 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5317 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5319 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5320 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5321 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5322 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5323 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5324 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5327 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5328 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5329 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5330 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5331 struct av_decision avd;
5336 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5337 * - Single threaded processes.
5338 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5339 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5341 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5342 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5343 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5344 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5345 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5346 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5347 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5348 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5354 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5355 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5359 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5360 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5361 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5365 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5366 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5369 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5370 if (tracer != NULL) {
5371 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5372 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5374 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5376 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5380 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5381 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5395 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5397 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5400 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5402 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5405 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5412 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5413 unsigned long flags)
5415 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5416 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5418 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5422 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5423 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5425 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5431 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5433 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5439 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5440 struct task_struct *ctx,
5444 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5445 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5447 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5449 tsec = ctx->security;
5450 ksec = key->security;
5452 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5453 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5454 appear to be created. */
5458 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5459 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5462 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5464 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5465 char *context = NULL;
5469 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5478 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5481 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5482 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5483 .capget = selinux_capget,
5484 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5485 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5486 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5487 .capable = selinux_capable,
5488 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5489 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5490 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5491 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5493 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5494 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5496 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5497 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5498 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5499 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5500 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5501 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5502 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5504 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5505 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5506 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5507 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5508 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5509 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5510 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5511 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5512 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5513 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5514 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5517 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5518 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5519 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5520 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5521 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5522 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5523 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5524 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5525 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5526 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5527 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5528 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5529 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5530 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5531 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5532 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5533 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5534 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5535 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5536 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5537 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5538 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5539 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5540 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5541 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5542 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5543 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5545 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5546 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5547 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5548 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5549 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5550 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5551 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5552 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5553 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5554 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5555 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5557 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5559 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5560 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5561 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5562 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5563 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5564 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5565 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5566 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5567 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5568 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5569 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5570 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5571 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5572 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5573 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5574 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5575 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5576 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5577 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5578 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5579 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5580 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5581 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5583 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5584 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5586 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5587 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5589 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5590 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5591 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5592 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5593 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5594 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5596 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5597 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5598 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5599 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5600 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5602 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5603 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5604 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5605 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5606 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5608 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5610 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5611 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5613 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5614 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5615 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5617 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5618 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5620 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5621 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5622 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5623 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5624 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5625 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5626 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5627 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5628 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5629 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5630 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5631 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5632 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5633 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5634 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5635 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5636 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5637 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5638 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5639 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5640 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5641 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5642 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5643 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5644 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5646 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5647 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5648 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5649 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5650 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5651 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5652 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5653 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5654 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5655 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5656 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5660 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5661 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5662 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5663 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5667 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5668 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5669 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5670 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5674 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5676 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5678 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5679 selinux_enabled = 0;
5683 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5684 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5688 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5690 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5691 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5692 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5693 tsec = current->security;
5694 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5696 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5697 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5698 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5701 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5703 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5704 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5705 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5707 if (selinux_enforcing)
5708 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5710 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5715 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5717 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5719 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5720 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5721 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5722 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5724 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5725 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5726 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5727 struct superblock_security_struct,
5729 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5731 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5732 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5733 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5735 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5737 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5738 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5739 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5742 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5743 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5746 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5747 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5748 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5750 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5752 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5754 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5755 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5757 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5758 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5761 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5762 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5764 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5765 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5768 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5769 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5771 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5772 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5776 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5778 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5780 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5781 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5783 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5784 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5787 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5788 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5790 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5791 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5797 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5801 if (!selinux_enabled)
5804 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5806 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5808 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5810 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5811 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5813 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5820 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5822 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5823 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5825 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5827 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5828 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5829 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5834 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5836 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5837 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5840 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5842 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5843 static int selinux_disabled;
5845 int selinux_disable(void)
5847 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5849 if (ss_initialized) {
5850 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5854 if (selinux_disabled) {
5855 /* Only do this once. */
5859 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5861 selinux_disabled = 1;
5862 selinux_enabled = 0;
5864 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5865 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5867 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5868 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5870 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */