2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
832 if (context || defcontext) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
871 if (context || defcontext) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct av_decision avd;
1425 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1426 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1429 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1433 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1435 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1438 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1442 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1447 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1448 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1449 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1456 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1457 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1460 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1462 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1463 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1466 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1467 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1468 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1469 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1470 struct inode *inode,
1472 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1475 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1478 validate_creds(cred);
1480 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1483 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1484 isec = inode->i_security;
1486 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1489 static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
1490 struct inode *inode,
1494 struct common_audit_data ad;
1496 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
1498 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
1501 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1502 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1503 pathname if needed. */
1504 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1505 struct dentry *dentry,
1508 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1509 struct common_audit_data ad;
1511 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1512 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1513 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1516 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1517 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1518 pathname if needed. */
1519 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1523 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1524 struct common_audit_data ad;
1526 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1528 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1531 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1532 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1533 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1534 check a particular permission to the file.
1535 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1536 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1537 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1538 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1539 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1543 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1544 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1545 struct common_audit_data ad;
1546 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1549 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1550 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1552 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1553 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1561 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1564 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1570 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1571 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1572 struct dentry *dentry,
1575 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1576 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1577 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1579 struct common_audit_data ad;
1582 dsec = dir->i_security;
1583 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1586 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1588 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1589 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1592 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1597 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1598 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1599 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1604 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1608 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1609 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1610 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1613 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1614 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1615 struct task_struct *ctx)
1617 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1619 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1623 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1626 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1627 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1628 struct dentry *dentry,
1632 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1633 struct common_audit_data ad;
1634 u32 sid = current_sid();
1638 dsec = dir->i_security;
1639 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1641 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1642 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1645 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1646 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1661 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1666 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1670 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1671 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1672 struct inode *new_dir,
1673 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1675 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1676 struct common_audit_data ad;
1677 u32 sid = current_sid();
1679 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1682 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1683 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1684 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1685 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1687 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1689 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1690 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1691 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1694 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1695 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1698 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1699 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1700 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1705 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1706 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1707 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1708 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1709 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1712 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1713 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1714 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1715 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1717 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1725 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1726 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1727 struct super_block *sb,
1729 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1731 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1732 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1734 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1735 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1738 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1739 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1743 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1744 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1745 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1746 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1749 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1751 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1755 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1757 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1759 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1766 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1767 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1771 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1773 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1774 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1781 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1790 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1793 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1795 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1797 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1803 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1805 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1810 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1814 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1815 u32 sid = current_sid();
1816 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1817 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1820 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1823 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1827 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1831 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1834 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1835 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1839 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1843 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1846 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1847 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1848 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1849 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1853 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1854 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1858 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1862 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1863 * which was removed).
1865 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1866 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1867 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1868 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1871 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1876 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1880 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1883 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1885 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1897 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1902 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1905 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1911 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1913 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1915 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1918 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1925 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1927 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1928 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1929 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1930 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1931 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1933 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1934 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1935 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1936 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1937 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1939 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1946 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1947 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1948 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1950 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1951 * processes that allocate mappings.
1953 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1955 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1957 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1958 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1962 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1965 /* binprm security operations */
1967 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1969 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1970 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1971 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1972 struct common_audit_data ad;
1973 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1976 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1980 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1981 * the script interpreter */
1982 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1985 old_tsec = current_security();
1986 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1987 isec = inode->i_security;
1989 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1990 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1991 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1993 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1994 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1995 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1996 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1998 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
1999 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2000 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2001 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2003 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2004 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2005 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2011 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
2012 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2014 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2015 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2017 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2018 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2019 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2023 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2024 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2025 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2029 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2030 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2034 /* Check for shared state */
2035 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2036 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2037 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2043 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2044 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2046 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2047 struct task_struct *tracer;
2048 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2052 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2053 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2054 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2060 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2062 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2068 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2069 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2075 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2077 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2085 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2086 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2087 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2088 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2090 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2093 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2096 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2097 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2098 struct files_struct *files)
2100 struct common_audit_data ad;
2101 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2102 struct tty_struct *tty;
2103 struct fdtable *fdt;
2107 tty = get_current_tty();
2109 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2110 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2111 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2112 struct inode *inode;
2114 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2115 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2116 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2117 file may belong to another process and we are only
2118 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2119 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2120 struct tty_file_private, list);
2121 file = file_priv->file;
2122 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2123 if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
2124 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
2128 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2131 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2135 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2137 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2139 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2141 unsigned long set, i;
2146 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2147 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2149 set = fdt->open_fds[j];
2152 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2153 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2158 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2160 file_to_av(file))) {
2162 fd = get_unused_fd();
2172 devnull = dentry_open(
2174 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2176 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2183 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2188 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2191 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2195 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2197 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2199 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2200 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2203 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2204 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2207 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2208 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2210 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2211 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2213 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2214 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2215 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2217 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2218 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2219 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2220 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2221 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2223 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2224 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2226 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2228 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2229 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2230 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2231 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2233 task_unlock(current);
2234 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2239 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2242 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2244 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2245 struct itimerval itimer;
2255 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2256 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2257 * flush and unblock signals.
2259 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2260 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2262 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2264 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2265 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2266 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2267 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2268 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2269 __flush_signals(current);
2270 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2271 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2273 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2276 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2277 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2278 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2279 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2280 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2283 /* superblock security operations */
2285 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2287 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2290 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2292 superblock_free_security(sb);
2295 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2300 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2303 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2305 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2306 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2307 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2308 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2309 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2312 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2319 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2323 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2326 int current_size = 0;
2334 while (current_size < len) {
2344 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2346 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2347 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2348 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2354 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2362 in_save = in_end = orig;
2366 open_quote = !open_quote;
2367 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2369 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2371 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2372 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2374 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2376 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2378 } while (*in_end++);
2380 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2381 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2386 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2389 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2390 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2391 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2393 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2399 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2402 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2403 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2406 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2408 goto out_free_secdata;
2410 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2412 goto out_free_secdata;
2414 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2415 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2417 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2421 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2423 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2424 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2426 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2427 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2428 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2434 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2435 goto out_bad_option;
2438 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2439 goto out_bad_option;
2441 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2442 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2443 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2445 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2446 goto out_bad_option;
2449 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2450 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2451 goto out_bad_option;
2460 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2462 free_secdata(secdata);
2465 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2466 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2471 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2473 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2474 struct common_audit_data ad;
2477 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2481 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2482 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2485 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2486 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2487 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2490 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2492 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2493 struct common_audit_data ad;
2495 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2496 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2497 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2500 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2503 unsigned long flags,
2506 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2508 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2509 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2510 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2512 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2515 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2517 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2519 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2520 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2523 /* inode security operations */
2525 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2527 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2530 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2532 inode_free_security(inode);
2535 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2536 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2537 void **value, size_t *len)
2539 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2540 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2541 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2542 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2544 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2546 dsec = dir->i_security;
2547 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2550 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2552 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2553 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2554 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2555 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2556 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2557 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2560 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2561 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2564 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2569 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2570 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2571 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2572 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2574 isec->initialized = 1;
2577 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2581 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2588 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2600 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2602 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2605 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2607 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2610 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2612 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2615 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2617 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2620 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2622 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2625 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2627 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2630 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2632 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2635 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2636 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2638 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2641 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2643 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2645 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2648 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2650 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2652 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2655 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2657 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2658 struct common_audit_data ad;
2661 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2663 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2664 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2666 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2670 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2674 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2676 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2678 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
2681 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2683 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2684 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2686 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2687 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2688 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2694 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2695 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2696 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2698 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2701 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2703 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2706 path.dentry = dentry;
2709 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2712 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2714 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2716 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2717 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2718 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2719 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2721 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2722 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2723 Restrict to administrator. */
2728 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2729 ordinary setattr permission. */
2730 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2733 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2734 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2736 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2737 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2738 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2739 struct common_audit_data ad;
2740 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2743 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2744 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2746 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2747 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2750 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2753 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2754 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2756 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2757 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2761 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2762 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2763 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2765 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2770 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2771 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2775 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2780 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2782 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2783 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2787 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2788 const void *value, size_t size,
2791 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2792 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2796 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2797 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2801 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2803 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2804 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2805 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2813 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2815 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2817 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2820 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2822 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2824 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2827 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2829 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2830 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2832 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2833 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2838 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2840 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2842 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2846 char *context = NULL;
2847 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2849 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2853 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2854 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2855 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2856 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2857 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2858 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2859 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2861 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2862 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2864 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2867 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2880 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2881 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2883 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2887 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2890 if (!value || !size)
2893 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2898 isec->initialized = 1;
2902 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2904 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2905 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2906 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2910 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2912 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2916 /* file security operations */
2918 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2920 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2921 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2923 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2924 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2927 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2928 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2931 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2933 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2934 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2935 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2936 u32 sid = current_sid();
2939 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2942 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2943 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2944 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2947 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2950 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2952 return file_alloc_security(file);
2955 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2957 file_free_security(file);
2960 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2963 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2973 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2975 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
2976 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2979 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2981 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
2982 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2985 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2989 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
2994 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
2995 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
2998 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2999 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3002 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3007 static int default_noexec;
3009 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3011 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3014 if (default_noexec &&
3015 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3017 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3018 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3019 * This has an additional check.
3021 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3027 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3028 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3030 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3031 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3034 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3035 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3037 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3044 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3045 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3046 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3049 u32 sid = current_sid();
3052 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3053 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3054 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3055 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3057 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3058 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3059 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3064 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3065 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3066 if (rc || addr_only)
3069 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3072 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3073 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3076 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3077 unsigned long reqprot,
3080 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3082 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3085 if (default_noexec &&
3086 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3088 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3089 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3090 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3091 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3092 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3093 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3094 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3095 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3097 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3098 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3099 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3100 * modified content. This typically should only
3101 * occur for text relocations.
3103 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3109 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3112 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3114 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3116 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3119 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3122 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3127 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3132 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3133 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3142 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3143 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3148 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3153 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3157 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3164 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3166 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3168 fsec = file->f_security;
3169 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3174 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3175 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3178 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3180 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3182 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3183 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3185 fsec = file->f_security;
3188 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3190 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3192 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3193 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3196 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3198 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3200 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3203 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3205 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3206 struct inode *inode;
3207 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3209 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3210 fsec = file->f_security;
3211 isec = inode->i_security;
3213 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3214 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3215 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3216 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3217 * struct as its SID.
3219 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3220 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3222 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3223 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3224 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3225 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3226 * new inode label or new policy.
3227 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3229 return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
3232 /* task security operations */
3234 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3236 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3240 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3242 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3244 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3246 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3250 cred->security = tsec;
3255 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3257 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3259 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3262 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3263 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3265 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3266 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3271 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3273 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3276 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3277 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3279 old_tsec = old->security;
3281 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3285 new->security = tsec;
3290 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3292 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3294 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3295 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3301 * set the security data for a kernel service
3302 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3304 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3306 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3307 u32 sid = current_sid();
3310 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3311 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3312 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3316 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3317 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3318 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3324 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3325 * objective context of the specified inode
3327 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3329 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3330 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3331 u32 sid = current_sid();
3334 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3335 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3336 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3340 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3344 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3347 struct common_audit_data ad;
3349 sid = task_sid(current);
3351 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3352 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3354 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3355 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3358 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3360 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3363 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3365 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3368 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3370 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3373 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3375 *secid = task_sid(p);
3378 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3382 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3386 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3389 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3393 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3397 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3400 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3402 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3405 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3406 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3408 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3410 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3411 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3412 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3413 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3414 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3415 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3420 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3424 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3428 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3431 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3433 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3436 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3438 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3441 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3448 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3450 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3452 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3453 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3455 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3459 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3461 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3464 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3465 struct inode *inode)
3467 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3468 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3471 isec->initialized = 1;
3474 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3475 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3476 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3478 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3479 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3481 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3482 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3486 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3487 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3490 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3491 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3495 *proto = ih->protocol;
3497 switch (ih->protocol) {
3499 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3501 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3505 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3509 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3510 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3515 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3517 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3521 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3525 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3526 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3530 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3531 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3533 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3537 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3541 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3542 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3553 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3555 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3556 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3557 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3560 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3561 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3564 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3565 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3569 ad->u.net.v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3570 ad->u.net.v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3573 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3574 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3575 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3584 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3586 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3590 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3591 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3596 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3598 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3602 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3603 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3607 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3608 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3610 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3614 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3615 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3619 /* includes fragments */
3629 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3630 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3635 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3637 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3640 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3641 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3644 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3646 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3649 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3650 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3660 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3661 " unable to parse packet\n");
3671 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3673 * @family: protocol family
3674 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3677 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3678 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3679 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3680 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3681 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3685 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3692 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3693 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3695 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3696 if (unlikely(err)) {
3698 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3699 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3706 /* socket security operations */
3708 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3709 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3711 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3712 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3716 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3720 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3722 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3723 struct common_audit_data ad;
3724 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3726 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3729 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3732 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3735 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3736 int protocol, int kern)
3738 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3746 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3747 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3751 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3754 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3755 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3757 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3758 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3759 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3762 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3765 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3767 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3772 isec->initialized = 1;
3775 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3776 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3777 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3778 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3784 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3785 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3786 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3788 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3790 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3794 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3799 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3800 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3801 * check the first address now.
3803 family = sk->sk_family;
3804 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3806 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3807 struct common_audit_data ad;
3808 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3809 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3810 unsigned short snum;
3813 if (family == PF_INET) {
3814 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3815 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3816 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3818 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3819 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3820 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3826 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3828 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3829 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3833 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3834 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3835 ad.u.net.family = family;
3836 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3838 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3844 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3845 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3846 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3849 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3850 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3853 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3854 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3858 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3862 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3866 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3867 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3868 ad.u.net.family = family;
3870 if (family == PF_INET)
3871 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3873 ad.u.net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3875 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3876 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3884 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3886 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3887 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3890 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3895 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3897 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3898 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3899 struct common_audit_data ad;
3900 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3901 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3902 unsigned short snum;
3905 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3906 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3907 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3909 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3911 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3912 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3914 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3917 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3921 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3922 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3924 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3925 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3926 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3927 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3932 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3938 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3940 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3943 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3946 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3947 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3949 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3953 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3955 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3956 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3957 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3958 newisec->initialized = 1;
3963 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3966 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3969 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3970 int size, int flags)
3972 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3975 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3977 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3980 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3982 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3985 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3989 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3993 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3996 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3999 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4002 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4004 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4007 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4011 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4012 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4013 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4014 struct common_audit_data ad;
4017 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4018 ad.u.net.sk = other;
4020 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4021 sksec_other->sclass,
4022 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4026 /* server child socket */
4027 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4028 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4033 /* connecting socket */
4034 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4039 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4040 struct socket *other)
4042 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4043 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4044 struct common_audit_data ad;
4046 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4047 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4049 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4053 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4055 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4061 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4064 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4065 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4069 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4072 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4073 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4076 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4080 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4081 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4082 struct common_audit_data ad;
4085 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4086 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4087 ad.u.net.family = family;
4088 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4092 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4093 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4099 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4102 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4107 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4110 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4111 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4112 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4113 struct common_audit_data ad;
4118 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4121 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4122 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4125 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4126 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4127 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4128 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4129 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4130 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4132 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4133 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4134 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4137 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4138 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4139 ad.u.net.family = family;
4140 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4144 if (peerlbl_active) {
4147 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4150 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4153 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4156 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4159 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4162 if (secmark_active) {
4163 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4172 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4173 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4178 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4179 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4181 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4182 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4183 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4184 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4185 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4187 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4191 if (scontext_len > len) {
4196 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4200 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4206 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4208 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4211 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4213 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4216 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4220 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4221 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4223 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4226 *secid = peer_secid;
4227 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4232 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4234 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4236 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4240 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4241 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4242 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4243 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4248 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4250 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4252 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4253 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4257 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4259 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4260 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4262 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4263 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4264 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4266 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4269 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4272 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4274 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4276 *secid = sksec->sid;
4280 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4282 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4283 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4285 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4286 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4287 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4288 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4291 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4292 struct request_sock *req)
4294 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4296 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4300 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4301 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4304 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4307 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4308 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4309 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4311 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4314 req->secid = newsid;
4315 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4318 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4321 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4322 const struct request_sock *req)
4324 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4326 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4327 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4328 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4329 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4330 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4331 time it will have been created and available. */
4333 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4334 * thread with access to newsksec */
4335 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4338 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4340 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4341 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4343 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4344 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4347 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4350 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4352 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4355 __tsec = current_security();
4358 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4361 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4363 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4366 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4368 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4371 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4374 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4377 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4379 u32 sid = current_sid();
4381 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4382 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4383 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4384 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4385 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4386 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4388 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4392 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4394 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4396 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4397 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4398 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4399 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4400 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4401 * protocols were being used */
4403 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4404 * the sockcreate SID here */
4406 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4407 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4410 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4412 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4413 u32 sid = current_sid();
4416 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4417 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4420 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4421 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4430 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4434 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4435 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4437 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4441 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4443 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4445 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4446 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4447 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4448 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4449 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4450 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4460 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4465 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4467 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4473 struct common_audit_data ad;
4478 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4481 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4482 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4483 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4484 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4487 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4490 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4491 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4492 ad.u.net.family = family;
4493 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4496 if (peerlbl_active) {
4497 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4500 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4506 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4507 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4511 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4512 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4513 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4515 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4521 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4522 struct sk_buff *skb,
4523 const struct net_device *in,
4524 const struct net_device *out,
4525 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4527 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4530 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4531 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4532 struct sk_buff *skb,
4533 const struct net_device *in,
4534 const struct net_device *out,
4535 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4537 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4541 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4546 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4549 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4550 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4551 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4553 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4556 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4557 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4563 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4564 struct sk_buff *skb,
4565 const struct net_device *in,
4566 const struct net_device *out,
4567 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4569 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4572 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4576 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4577 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4578 struct common_audit_data ad;
4584 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4586 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4587 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4588 ad.u.net.family = family;
4589 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4592 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4593 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4594 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4595 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4597 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4598 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4603 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4609 struct common_audit_data ad;
4614 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4615 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4616 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4617 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4618 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4619 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4621 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4622 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4623 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4624 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4625 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4626 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4627 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4630 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4631 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4632 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4635 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4636 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4637 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4638 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4642 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4643 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4646 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4647 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4650 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4651 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4652 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4655 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4656 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4657 ad.u.net.family = family;
4658 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4662 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4663 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4664 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4666 if (peerlbl_active) {
4670 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4672 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4673 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4674 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4676 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4678 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4679 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4680 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4686 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4687 struct sk_buff *skb,
4688 const struct net_device *in,
4689 const struct net_device *out,
4690 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4692 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4695 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4696 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4697 struct sk_buff *skb,
4698 const struct net_device *in,
4699 const struct net_device *out,
4700 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4702 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4706 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4708 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4712 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4716 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4719 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4720 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4723 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4726 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4730 sid = task_sid(task);
4731 isec->sclass = sclass;
4733 perm->security = isec;
4738 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4740 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4741 perm->security = NULL;
4745 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4747 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4749 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4753 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4754 msg->security = msec;
4759 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4761 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4763 msg->security = NULL;
4767 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4770 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4771 struct common_audit_data ad;
4772 u32 sid = current_sid();
4774 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4776 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4777 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4779 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4782 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4784 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4787 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4789 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4792 /* message queue security operations */
4793 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4795 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4796 struct common_audit_data ad;
4797 u32 sid = current_sid();
4800 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4804 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4806 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4807 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4809 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4812 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4818 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4820 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4823 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4825 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4826 struct common_audit_data ad;
4827 u32 sid = current_sid();
4829 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4831 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4832 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4834 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4835 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4838 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4846 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4847 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4850 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4853 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4856 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4862 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4866 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4868 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4869 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4870 struct common_audit_data ad;
4871 u32 sid = current_sid();
4874 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4875 msec = msg->security;
4878 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4880 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4882 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4883 * message queue this message will be stored in
4885 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4891 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4892 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4894 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4895 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4898 /* Can this process send the message */
4899 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4902 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4903 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4904 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4909 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4910 struct task_struct *target,
4911 long type, int mode)
4913 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4914 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4915 struct common_audit_data ad;
4916 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4919 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4920 msec = msg->security;
4922 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4923 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4925 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4926 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4928 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4929 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4933 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4934 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4936 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4937 struct common_audit_data ad;
4938 u32 sid = current_sid();
4941 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4945 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4947 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4948 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4950 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4953 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4959 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4961 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4964 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct common_audit_data ad;
4968 u32 sid = current_sid();
4970 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4972 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4973 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4975 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4976 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4979 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4980 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4988 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4989 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4992 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4995 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5002 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5008 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5012 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5013 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5017 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5020 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5022 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5025 /* Semaphore security operations */
5026 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5028 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5029 struct common_audit_data ad;
5030 u32 sid = current_sid();
5033 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5037 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5039 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5040 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5042 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5045 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5051 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5053 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5056 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5058 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5059 struct common_audit_data ad;
5060 u32 sid = current_sid();
5062 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5064 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5065 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5067 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5068 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5071 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5072 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5080 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5081 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5085 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5096 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5099 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5103 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5109 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5113 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5114 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5119 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5123 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5126 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5132 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5134 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5139 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5142 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5144 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5148 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5151 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5154 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5155 char *name, char **value)
5157 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5163 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5169 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5171 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5173 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5175 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5176 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5177 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5178 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5179 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5180 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5181 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5182 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5190 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5200 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5201 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5203 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5204 struct task_struct *tracer;
5211 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5212 security attributes. */
5217 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5218 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5219 * above restriction is ever removed.
5221 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5222 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5223 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5224 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5225 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5226 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5227 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5228 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5229 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5230 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5236 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5237 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5238 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5242 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5243 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5244 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5246 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5253 new = prepare_creds();
5257 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5258 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5259 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5260 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5261 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5262 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5263 tsec = new->security;
5264 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5265 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5266 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5267 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5268 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5269 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5272 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5273 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5274 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5275 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5280 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5282 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5283 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5288 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5289 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5290 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5294 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5295 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5298 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5300 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5304 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5305 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5324 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5326 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5329 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5331 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5334 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5340 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5342 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5344 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5348 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5350 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5352 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5355 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5358 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5367 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5368 unsigned long flags)
5370 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5371 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5373 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5377 tsec = cred->security;
5378 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5379 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5381 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5387 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5389 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5395 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5396 const struct cred *cred,
5400 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5403 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5404 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5405 appear to be created. */
5409 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5411 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5412 ksec = key->security;
5414 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5417 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5419 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5420 char *context = NULL;
5424 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5433 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5436 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5437 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5438 .capget = selinux_capget,
5439 .capset = selinux_capset,
5440 .capable = selinux_capable,
5441 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5442 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5443 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5444 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5446 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5448 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5449 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5450 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5451 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5453 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5454 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5455 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5456 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5457 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5458 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5459 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5460 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5461 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5462 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5463 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5464 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5467 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5468 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5469 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5470 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5471 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5472 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5473 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5474 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5475 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5476 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5477 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5478 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5479 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5480 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5481 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5482 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5483 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5484 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5485 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5486 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5487 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5488 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5489 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5490 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5491 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5493 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5494 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5495 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5496 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5497 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5498 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5499 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5500 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5501 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5502 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5503 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5505 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5507 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5508 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5509 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5510 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5511 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5512 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5513 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5514 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5515 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5516 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5517 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5518 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5519 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5520 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5521 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5522 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5523 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5524 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5525 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5526 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5527 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5528 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5530 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5531 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5533 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5534 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5536 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5537 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5538 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5539 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5540 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5541 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5543 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5544 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5545 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5546 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5547 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5549 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5550 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5551 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5552 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5553 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5555 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5557 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5558 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5560 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5561 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5562 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5563 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5564 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5565 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5567 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5568 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5570 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5571 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5572 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5573 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5574 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5575 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5576 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5577 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5578 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5579 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5580 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5581 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5582 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5583 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5584 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5585 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5586 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5587 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5588 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5589 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5590 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5591 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5592 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5593 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5594 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5595 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5596 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5597 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5598 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5599 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5600 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5602 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5603 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5604 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5605 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5606 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5607 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5608 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5609 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5610 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5611 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5612 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5616 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5617 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5618 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5619 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5623 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5624 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5625 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5626 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5630 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5632 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5633 selinux_enabled = 0;
5637 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5638 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5642 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5644 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5645 cred_init_security();
5647 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5649 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5650 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5651 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5654 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5655 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5657 if (selinux_enforcing)
5658 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5660 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5665 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5667 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5670 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5672 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5674 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5675 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5676 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5679 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5680 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5681 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5683 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5685 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5687 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5688 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5690 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5691 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5694 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5695 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5697 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5698 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5701 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5702 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5704 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5705 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5709 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5711 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5713 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5714 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5716 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5717 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5720 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5721 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5723 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5724 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5730 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5734 if (!selinux_enabled)
5737 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5739 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5741 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5743 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5744 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5746 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5753 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5755 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5756 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5758 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5760 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5761 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5762 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5767 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5769 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5770 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5773 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5775 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5776 static int selinux_disabled;
5778 int selinux_disable(void)
5780 if (ss_initialized) {
5781 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5785 if (selinux_disabled) {
5786 /* Only do this once. */
5790 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5792 selinux_disabled = 1;
5793 selinux_enabled = 0;
5795 reset_security_ops();
5797 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5800 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5801 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5803 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */