1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
7 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
19 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
21 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
23 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
24 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
26 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
27 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
28 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 #include <linux/init.h>
33 #include <asm/atomic.h>
34 #include <asm/types.h>
36 #include <linux/module.h>
37 #include <linux/mount.h>
38 #include <linux/socket.h>
39 #include <linux/audit.h>
40 #include <linux/personality.h>
41 #include <linux/time.h>
42 #include <linux/kthread.h>
43 #include <asm/unistd.h>
46 1 = put_count checking
47 2 = verbose put_count checking
51 /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
52 extern int audit_enabled;
54 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
55 * for saving names from getname(). */
56 #define AUDIT_NAMES 20
58 /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
59 * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
61 #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
63 /* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
64 a per-task filter. At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
65 the syscall filter. */
67 AUDIT_DISABLED, /* Do not create per-task audit_context.
68 * No syscall-specific audit records can
70 AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
71 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
72 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
74 AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT, /* Create the per-task audit_context,
75 * and always fill it in at syscall
76 * entry time. This makes a full
77 * syscall record available if some
78 * other part of the kernel decides it
79 * should be recorded. */
80 AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT /* Create the per-task audit_context,
81 * always fill it in at syscall entry
82 * time, and always write out the audit
83 * record at syscall exit time. */
86 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
87 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
88 * pointers at syscall exit time).
90 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
102 struct audit_aux_data {
103 struct audit_aux_data *next;
107 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
109 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
110 struct audit_aux_data d;
112 unsigned long qbytes;
118 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
119 struct audit_aux_data d;
121 unsigned long args[0];
124 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr {
125 struct audit_aux_data d;
130 struct audit_aux_data_path {
131 struct audit_aux_data d;
132 struct dentry *dentry;
133 struct vfsmount *mnt;
136 /* The per-task audit context. */
137 struct audit_context {
138 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
139 enum audit_state state;
140 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
141 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
142 uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */
143 int major; /* syscall number */
144 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
145 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
146 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
147 int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */
149 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
151 struct vfsmount * pwdmnt;
152 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
153 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
155 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
157 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
158 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
159 unsigned long personality;
169 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
170 * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
171 * syscall exit time. */
172 static struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
173 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]),
174 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]),
175 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]),
176 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]),
177 LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]),
178 #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 5
179 #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser
184 struct list_head list;
186 struct audit_rule rule;
189 extern int audit_pid;
191 /* Check to see if two rules are identical. It is called from
192 * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
193 static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
197 if (a->flags != b->flags)
200 if (a->action != b->action)
203 if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
206 for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
207 if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
208 || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
212 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
213 if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
219 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
220 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
221 * audit_netlink_sem. */
222 static inline void audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
223 struct list_head *list)
225 if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) {
226 entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
227 list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
229 list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
233 static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
235 struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
239 /* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
240 * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
241 * audit_netlink_sem. */
242 static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
243 struct list_head *list)
245 struct audit_entry *e;
247 /* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
248 * deletion routine. */
249 list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
250 if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
251 list_del_rcu(&e->list);
252 call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
256 return -ENOENT; /* No matching rule */
259 /* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space. Called during
261 static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
265 if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
266 && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
267 && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
269 if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
271 if ((s->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
275 d->action = s->action;
276 d->field_count = s->field_count;
277 for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
278 d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
279 d->values[i] = s->values[i];
281 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
285 static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
289 struct audit_entry *entry;
296 down(&audit_netlink_sem);
298 /* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
299 always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
300 for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
301 list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_filter_list[i], list)
302 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
303 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
305 audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
307 up(&audit_netlink_sem);
311 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
314 struct audit_entry *entry;
315 struct task_struct *tsk;
322 /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill
323 * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for
324 * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to
325 * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl
326 * trying to _send_ the stuff */
328 dest = kmalloc(2 * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
334 tsk = kthread_run(audit_list_rules, dest, "audit_list_rules");
341 if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
343 if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
347 listnr = entry->rule.flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
348 audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
349 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
350 "auid=%u added an audit rule\n", loginuid);
353 listnr =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
354 if (listnr >= AUDIT_NR_FILTERS)
357 err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_filter_list[listnr]);
359 audit_log(NULL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
360 "auid=%u removed an audit rule\n", loginuid);
369 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
371 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
372 struct audit_rule *rule,
373 struct audit_context *ctx,
374 enum audit_state *state)
378 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
379 u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
380 u32 value = rule->values[i];
385 result = (tsk->pid == value);
388 result = (tsk->uid == value);
391 result = (tsk->euid == value);
394 result = (tsk->suid == value);
397 result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
400 result = (tsk->gid == value);
403 result = (tsk->egid == value);
406 result = (tsk->sgid == value);
409 result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
412 result = (tsk->personality == value);
416 result = (ctx->arch == value);
420 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
421 result = (ctx->return_code == value);
424 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
425 result = (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
429 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
430 if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
439 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
440 if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
449 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
450 if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
460 result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
467 result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
471 if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
476 switch (rule->action) {
477 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
478 case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break;
479 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
484 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
485 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
486 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
488 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
490 struct audit_entry *e;
491 enum audit_state state;
494 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
495 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
501 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
504 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
505 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
506 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
507 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
509 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
510 struct audit_context *ctx,
511 struct list_head *list)
513 struct audit_entry *e;
514 enum audit_state state;
515 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
516 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
518 if (audit_pid && ctx->pid == audit_pid)
519 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
522 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
523 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
524 && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
530 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
533 int audit_filter_user(struct task_struct *tsk, int type)
535 struct audit_entry *e;
536 enum audit_state state;
538 if (audit_pid && tsk->pid == audit_pid)
539 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
542 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_USER], list) {
543 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
545 return state != AUDIT_DISABLED;
549 return 1; /* Audit by default */
553 /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
554 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
558 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
560 if (likely(!context))
562 context->return_valid = return_valid;
563 context->return_code = return_code;
565 if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
566 enum audit_state state;
567 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
568 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
569 context->auditable = 1;
572 context->pid = tsk->pid;
573 context->uid = tsk->uid;
574 context->gid = tsk->gid;
575 context->euid = tsk->euid;
576 context->suid = tsk->suid;
577 context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
578 context->egid = tsk->egid;
579 context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
580 context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
581 context->personality = tsk->personality;
582 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
586 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
591 if (context->auditable
592 ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
593 printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
594 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
595 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
597 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
598 context->name_count, context->put_count,
600 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
601 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
602 context->names[i].name,
603 context->names[i].name);
609 context->put_count = 0;
610 context->ino_count = 0;
613 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
614 if (context->names[i].name)
615 __putname(context->names[i].name);
616 context->name_count = 0;
620 mntput(context->pwdmnt);
622 context->pwdmnt = NULL;
625 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
627 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
629 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
630 if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) {
631 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
635 context->aux = aux->next;
640 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
641 enum audit_state state)
643 uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
645 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
646 context->state = state;
647 context->loginuid = loginuid;
650 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
652 struct audit_context *context;
654 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
656 audit_zero_context(context, state);
660 /* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
661 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
662 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
664 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
666 struct audit_context *context;
667 enum audit_state state;
669 if (likely(!audit_enabled))
670 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
672 state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
673 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
676 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
677 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
681 /* Preserve login uid */
682 context->loginuid = -1;
683 if (current->audit_context)
684 context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
686 tsk->audit_context = context;
687 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
691 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
693 struct audit_context *previous;
697 previous = context->previous;
698 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
700 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
701 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
702 context->serial, context->major,
703 context->name_count, count);
705 audit_free_names(context);
706 audit_free_aux(context);
711 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
714 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)
716 char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
717 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
718 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
720 get_task_comm(name, current);
721 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
722 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
727 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
730 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
732 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
733 vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
734 vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
739 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
742 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
745 struct audit_buffer *ab;
746 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
748 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
750 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
751 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
752 context->arch, context->major);
753 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
754 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
755 if (context->return_valid)
756 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
757 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
758 context->return_code);
760 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
761 " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
762 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
763 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
773 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
774 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
775 audit_log_task_info(ab);
778 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
780 ab = audit_log_start(context, aux->type);
782 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
786 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
788 " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
789 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
792 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
794 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux;
795 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs);
796 for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++)
797 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]);
800 case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: {
801 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux;
803 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
804 audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len);
807 case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: {
808 struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux;
809 audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt);
816 if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
817 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_CWD);
819 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
823 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
824 ab = audit_log_start(context, AUDIT_PATH);
826 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
828 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
829 if (context->names[i].name) {
830 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
831 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name);
833 audit_log_format(ab, " flags=%x\n", context->names[i].flags);
835 if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
836 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
837 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
838 context->names[i].ino,
839 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
840 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
841 context->names[i].mode,
842 context->names[i].uid,
843 context->names[i].gid,
844 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
845 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
850 /* Free a per-task audit context. Called from copy_process and
851 * __put_task_struct. */
852 void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
854 struct audit_context *context;
857 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
860 if (likely(!context))
863 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
864 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
865 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
866 audit_log_exit(context);
868 audit_free_context(context);
871 /* Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
872 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
873 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
874 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
875 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
876 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
878 void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
879 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
880 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
882 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
883 enum audit_state state;
887 /* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
888 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
889 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
890 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
891 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
895 * ppc64 yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
897 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
898 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
900 if (context->in_syscall) {
901 struct audit_context *newctx;
903 #if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
904 /* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
905 if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
910 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
911 " entering syscall=%d\n",
912 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
914 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
916 newctx->previous = context;
918 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
920 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
921 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
922 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
923 * to abandon auditing. */
924 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
927 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
932 context->arch = arch;
933 context->major = major;
934 context->argv[0] = a1;
935 context->argv[1] = a2;
936 context->argv[2] = a3;
937 context->argv[3] = a4;
939 state = context->state;
940 if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
941 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
942 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
945 context->serial = audit_serial();
946 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
947 context->in_syscall = 1;
948 context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
951 /* Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
952 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
953 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
954 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
955 * free the names stored from getname(). */
956 void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
958 struct audit_context *context;
960 get_task_struct(tsk);
962 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
965 /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
966 * called __put_task_struct. */
967 if (likely(!context))
970 if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
971 audit_log_exit(context);
973 context->in_syscall = 0;
974 context->auditable = 0;
976 if (context->previous) {
977 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
978 context->previous = NULL;
979 audit_free_context(context);
980 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
982 audit_free_names(context);
983 audit_free_aux(context);
984 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
985 tsk->audit_context = context;
987 put_task_struct(tsk);
990 /* Add a name to the list. Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
991 void audit_getname(const char *name)
993 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
995 if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
998 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1000 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1001 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1006 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1007 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
1008 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1009 ++context->name_count;
1010 if (!context->pwd) {
1011 read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
1012 context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd);
1013 context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt);
1014 read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
1019 /* Intercept a putname request. Called from
1020 * include/linux/fs.h:putname(). If we have stored the name from
1021 * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
1023 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1025 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1028 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1029 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1030 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1031 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1032 if (context->name_count) {
1034 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1035 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1036 context->names[i].name,
1037 context->names[i].name);
1044 ++context->put_count;
1045 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1046 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1047 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1050 context->serial, context->major,
1051 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1052 context->put_count);
1059 /* Store the inode and device from a lookup. Called from
1060 * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
1061 void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags)
1064 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1066 if (!context->in_syscall)
1068 if (context->name_count
1069 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1070 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1071 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1072 else if (context->name_count > 1
1073 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1074 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1075 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1077 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1078 * associated name? */
1079 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
1081 idx = context->name_count++;
1082 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
1084 ++context->ino_count;
1087 context->names[idx].flags = flags;
1088 context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino;
1089 context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1090 context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
1091 context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid;
1092 context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid;
1093 context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
1096 void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1097 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1099 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1100 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1101 *serial = ctx->serial;
1105 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
1107 if (task->audit_context) {
1108 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1110 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1112 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
1113 "old auid=%u new auid=%u",
1114 task->pid, task->uid,
1115 task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid);
1118 task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid;
1123 uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
1125 return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
1128 int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
1130 struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
1131 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1133 if (likely(!context))
1136 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
1140 ax->qbytes = qbytes;
1145 ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
1146 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1147 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1151 int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
1153 struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax;
1154 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1156 if (likely(!context))
1159 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
1164 memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
1166 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
1167 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1168 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1172 int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
1174 struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax;
1175 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1177 if (likely(!context))
1180 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
1185 memcpy(ax->a, a, len);
1187 ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR;
1188 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1189 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1193 int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt)
1195 struct audit_aux_data_path *ax;
1196 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1198 if (likely(!context))
1201 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
1205 ax->dentry = dget(dentry);
1206 ax->mnt = mntget(mnt);
1208 ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH;
1209 ax->d.next = context->aux;
1210 context->aux = (void *)ax;
1214 void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
1216 extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;
1217 extern uid_t audit_sig_uid;
1219 if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->pid == audit_pid)) {
1220 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) {
1221 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1222 audit_sig_pid = current->pid;
1224 audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
1226 audit_sig_uid = current->uid;